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Jacek Kucharczyk
Introduction:
Democracy in Poland 2005–2007
The results of the 2005 elections in a number of Central European Countries
raised concerns about the state of democracy in new EU Member States.
Populist government coalitions in Poland and Slovakia, anti-government riots
in Hungary, orchestrated by the right-wing opposition, and a prolonged period
of forming a new government coalition in the Czech Republic, posed the
question of whether these countries are backsliding from their commitment to
democracy and the rule of law, which had been a necessary condition of their
winning the coveted EU membership.
The present volume is a result of independent monitoring of the changes
occurring in Poland following the 2005 elections in the areas relevant for the
functioning of democracy: the law, institutions and public opinion attitudes.
The government coalition, which was established as a result of those elections,
came to power promising a radical institutional overhaul of the political
system, with the aim of purging corruption from the public life, thus making
the state more effective as well as restoring public trust in key institutions of
Polish democracy. Last but not least, the parties which formed the new
government promised the voters a more just distribution of the fruits of
economic growth, which Poland had experienced since the launch of market
reforms in 1989. The three parties which formed the coalition sought
legitimacy of their project from the fact that none of them previously formed
a part of the government coalition. As such they could not be held responsible
for the weaknesses of the process of democratic and market reforms initiated
after the fall of communism and concluded with Poland’s entry into the EU in
May 2004. This claim of political ‘virginity’, coupled with the denunciation of
the political, but also economic and intellectual elites, gave the new ruling
coalition a populist orientation, which remained its trademark until the early
elections in October 2007 ended its hold on power.
Looking back at the causes of the 2005 upheaval, some observers concluded
that it was a result of a backlash against the EU enlargement process and the
reform fatigue which affected the societies of the new Member States. Such an
explanation may have seemed plausible in view of the anti-enlargement
sentiment prevailing among the publics of the old EU-15 countries. One
should keep in mind that in the same year 2005 the referenda in France and the
Netherlands, two of the EU founding members, led to the rejection of the new
Constitutional Treaty, whose aim was to give the EU the institutional reforms
necessary to better cope with the challenges of the enlarged union. The 2005
elections provided the sceptics with the ammunition to criticise the
enlargement project by pointing out that the disciplinary power of membership 
works only during the pre-accession period. Once formal membership is
achieved, they argued, a new member has little if no incentive to observe the
democratic standards it had sworn to. The fact that the populist coalition in
Poland included two (junior) parties which two years earlier had urged the
rejection of the EU Accession Treaty seemed to further warrant such an
interpretation.
Nevertheless, the developments of the last two years seem to indicate that the
EU membership continues to be a part of the solution, and not a source of the
problems of the Polish political transformation. The high level of satisfaction
with the outcome of the accession turned out to be one of the factors which
gradually undermined the populists’ appeal.
The roots of the 2005 populist victory in Poland lie in a number of persistent
problems of Polish democratic transformation. These include economic
problems, especially very high levels of unemployment throughout the 1990s
and culminating just before EU entry. During those years Poland also suffered
from endemic corruption, which – according to Transparency International –
was higher than in any other Central European country, except for Romania.
Social researchers also indicate low levels of social capital, including low trust
in fellow citizens as well as in democratic institutions, and low levels of
participation in non-governmental organisations. Last but not least, Polish
voters are among the most apathetic in Europe, with election turnouts usually
well below 50%. All these factors contributed to the short-lived triumph of
populism in Poland in the period 2005–2007.
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Populism has accompanied Polish democracy since its inception in 1989. In
the 1990 presidential elections, a completely unknown candidate Stanis³aw
Tymiñski managed to overtake the first Polish non-communist Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, if only to be defeated in the final round by the hero of
the Solidarity Movement Lech Wa³êsa, himself not immune to populist
rhetoric. During the 1990s the discontent with market reforms helped bring
reformed communists back to power, while the opponents of Poland’s
negotiated transition, sealed with the round table agreement, continued to
challenge the status quo with their calls for de-communisation and the vetting
of communist secret police collaborators (lustration). At the same time, the
Polish Catholic Church was not shy about using the moral authority gained
from its resistance to a communist dictatorship to make demands for legal and
institutional changes reflecting “the Christian values” allegedly shared by
a majority of Poles.
Despite these challenges, the process of the consolidation of Polish democracy 
continued. In 1997 the parliament adopted a new democratic constitution,
which proclaimed the “3rd Republic of Poland” as a “democratic country ruled 
by law”. The constitution was subsequently approved in a popular referendum, 
despite strong criticism from the right-wing parties not represented in the
parliament.
One of the key factors stabilising the Polish political scene during the difficult
early years of transition was the idea of Poland’s “Return to Europe”. A great
majority of the society and the political classes agreed that Poland should
re-join the western world though membership in NATO and the European
Union. The hardships of the reforms were accepted as a necessary price for
achieving this aim and the politicians questioning European integration were
effectively marginalised by voters and mainstream political parties.
The discontent with the state of Polish democracy gained a new intensity after
Poland joined the EU. The post-communist government led by PM Leszek
Miller, which came to power in 2001 with unprecedented popular support,
successfully continued and completed membership negotiations with the EU
and won the accession referendum with a comfortable majority. At the same
time, Miller’s government was plagued by a series of corruption scandals, which 
led the public opinion to believe that Polish democracy was in a very poor shape
and needed a thorough “revamping”. The state of moral panic affected not only
the opposition to the government but also the liberal media and the opinion
makers, who religiously followed the revelations of the parliamentary
investigation committees established to uncover corruption in high places. 
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For the right-wing opposition, the alleged moral decay of the post-communist
Miller government was proof of the “original sin” of Poland’s road to
democracy, i.e. lack of de-communisation and lustration. This allowed (as they 
claimed) the former communists to assume the positions of political and
economic power and to create the “phony democracy” of the 3rd Republic.
The right-wing opposition – both in its more moderate conservative version as
well as its radical/populist one – proclaimed the need to establish the “4th
Republic” based on republican political ethos and the moral teachings of the
Catholic Church. In this way, the crusade against corruption was coupled with
anti-communism and social conservatism. 
The present publication purports to examine the consequences of the attempts
to implement the idea of the 4th Republic. Each of the chapters starts with
a short “opening balance”, assessing the initial state of affairs in a given area
and then proceeds to analyse more closely the developments following the
2005 elections and the formation of a populist coalition.
The opening chapter, authored by Wojciech Sadurski, analyses the
functioning of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court as well as the
ideas for constitutional reform put forward by the main party of the coalition,
Law and Justice (PiS). In the situation where the coalition lacked enough votes
in the parliament to change the existing Constitution, its politicians sustained
a campaign aimed at discrediting both the ‘post-communist’ constitution and
judges of the Constitutional Court. At the same time, the rulings of the
Constitutional Court brought down a number of political projects of this
government, including the vetting of an estimated 2 million citizens holding
positions of public importance. The Court decided that the law breached
a number of basic constitutional rights of citizens, including the presumption
of innocence. As Professor Sadurski argues, this was just one example of
a number of PiS policies that breached the letter or the spirit of the
Constitution.
The control of the legislative process was instrumental in fulfilling the
objectives of institutionalising the “4th Republic”. Although the coalition with 
the radical parties gave PiS a comfortable majority, they also used their control 
of the parliamentary agenda and numerical majority in parliamentary
committees to marginalise the opposition and prevent any substantive debates
on the most controversial legal changes. The institution of public hearing,
giving citizens a chance to voice their opinion on bills debated in the
parliament, also fell into neglect. Wies³aw Staœkiewicz describes in the chapter 
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on the legislative process how under the PiS-appointed Speaker, the
parliament came close to becoming a voting machine rather than a place of
debate and its controlling role vis-B-vis the government was nil. 
In the chapter on the party system, Rados³aw Markowski examines the
consequences of the lack of consolidation of the political parties in Poland,
evident in comparison to other “young” democracies from Central and Eastern
Europe. It can be argued that it was this absence of a stable and predictable
party system and volatile electorates that made the capture of power by
radicals and populists in 2005 possible. The decline of the post-communist left
led to the monopolisation of the political debate by the right. In addition, the
record low turnout in the 2005 elections allowed Law and Justice to form
a government even though this party was backed by only 10.4% of eligible
voters. 
Adam Bodnar and Micha³ Zió³kowski examine the impact of Law and Justice
policies on the justice system and security services. The disagreement as to
who should control security services was the key reason for the failure of the
“grand coalition” between PiS and the Citizens’ Platform in 2005. After PiS
entered the coalition with the two radical parties, it monopolised its control
over these services. The critics of the government accused it of using the
security services against political opponents, e.g. by widespread surveillance
without proper control of the courts. Spectacular arrests of suspects and media
leaks from secret services became the everyday reality of Polish political life.
After the 2007 elections the new parliament established special committees to
investigate these alleged abuses.
The Ministry of Justice, under a young, ambitious and media savvy Zbigniew
Ziobro became a focal point for the PiS crusade against “legal impossibilism”.
This expression was coined by Law and Justice politicians to describe the
constraints faced by the executive branch of the government in its attempts to
bring “justice for all” in the form of “liberal” laws (including the Constitution)
as well as corporations of lawyers and judges. Minister Ziobro prepared
a number of bills aiming at restricting the independence of prosecutors,
attorneys and judges as well as increasing the repressive character of the penal
code. 
In order to bring about a breakthrough in the fight against corruption, a new
institution was established: the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA). The
new institution was given a large budget and broad powers to investigate the
alleged cases of corruption, including political corruption. The formula of the
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CBA was from the beginning criticised by legal experts and non-governmental 
organisations (including the Polish Helsinki Foundation, the Stefan Batory
Foundation as well as the Institute of Public Affairs) for its lack of
accountability and excessive concentration on “hard power” rather than on the
prevention of corruption. The parliamentary opposition worried that the CBA
would be used against it for political rather than legal aims (although it should
be noted that the Citizens’ Platform voted in favour of the CBA, only later
joining its critics). The analysis conducted by Adam Bodnar and Dawid
Szeœci³o in the present volume indicates that these critical voices, albeit
disregarded by the government, proved largely correct. In fact, the CBA
played a key role in an attempt to implicate PiS coalition partner and Deputy
PM Andrzej Lepper in a corruption scandal, which led to the decomposition of
the coalition and early elections in October 2007.
Other important areas for the quality of Polish democracy, such as public
administration and the non-governmental sector, also came under heavy
pressure from the government seeking to expand its influence in all areas of
public life (see the chapters by Krzysztof Burnetko and Grzegorz Makowski). 
At the same time, as Lena Kolarska-Bobiñska describes in the chapter on
citizens’ activity and public protest, the government policies led to
a mobilisation of different social groups and milieus on a scale unseen in
Poland since the rise of the Solidarity Movement in 1980.
As Beata Roguska shows in her chapter on public opinion, the two years of the
“4th Republic” experiment paradoxically brought about the strengthening of
public trust in democracy. The authoritarian rhetoric of PiS, which enjoyed
some public support in 2005, had been compromised by a string of political
scandals as well as the cynicism of the proponents of the “moral revolution”
who allied themselves with right-wing extremists and shady businessmen.
At the same time, the continuous economic growth, falling unemployment as
well as overall satisfaction with Poland’s membership in the EU gradually
eroded support for the populist alternative in politics. 
 
The Polish experiment with “illiberal democracy” has been effectively resisted 
by political opposition, independent media and civil society, as well as other
democratic institutions, most notably the Constitutional Tribunal and the
judiciary. The systematically growing number of opponents of the government 
led to the electoral tsunami of 2007 when voters turned out en masse to vote
against the government. 
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The 2007 elections seem to have brought the Polish political scene a step
closer to “European standards”. The fact that both parties of the new coalition
– the PO and PSL – have long been members of European People’s Party
seems to have both symbolic and practical meaning in this respect. In the new
parliament the coalition will face the opposition not so much from the left but
from populist Law and Justice Party supported by President Kaczyñski. 
One may suppose that a condition of further “Europeanisation” of Polish
politics is the rebuilding of the credible left-wing opposition to the centre-right 
government of PO-PSL. Such opposition could attract part of the
economically egalitarian electorate of PiS and thus decouple the mix of
egalitarianism and conservatism that produced the 2005–2007 populist
coalition. The credible European left still seems to be a work-in-progress as it
still has to tackle its post-communist legacy.
At the same time, many of the problems of the Polish transformation that were
turned into the slogans of the “moral revolution” in 2005, including the poor
quality of political life, weak public administration, corruption and the
public’s mistrust of the politicians, are unlikely to disappear any time soon.
Neither will the public’s concern with these issues, as testified in the relatively
strong support for PiS in the 2007 elections. These issues will have to be
effectively addressed by successive governments. A number of political
reforms strengthening democratic institutions, division of powers and checks
and balances within the government should also be put on the agenda if Poland
wants to avoid the repetition of the abuses of power characteristic of the
2005–2007 government. Designing and implementing such reforms remains
a challenge for politicians as well as think-tanks and other civil society
organisations.
The same is true about the economic divisions in the country, which (as the
results of the 2007 elections clearly demonstrated) continue to play a role in
determining the Polish political landscape. Although statistical data seem to
indicate that the fast economic growth that Poland has enjoyed also benefits
the poorer segments of the society, policies aimed at increasing social
cohesion, making good use of EU funds, should supplement the ‘invisible
hand of the market’ here.
Above all, Poles need to start trusting each other as well as their democratic
institutions much more. It remains to be seen whether the new Polish Prime
Minister Donald Tusk and his government can make good on the promise to
base its policies on trust in citizens and whether the citizens will reciprocate. 
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Wo j ciech Sa du r ski
The Con sti tu tio nal Or der
In tro du c tion
The po li ti cal sy stem mo del in Po land is a con sti tu tio nal de mo c ra cy. Such
a po li ti cal sy stem sets ce r ta in li mits for ac tions de si g ned to fu l fil the
de mo c ra tic will of the na tion. Tho se li mits, ari sing from the pro vi sions of the
Con sti tu tion, are the fol lo wing:
“-pro ce du ral li mi ta tions- bin ding po li ti cal de ci sions must be ta ken fol lo wing
the pro ce du res esta b li s hed only by the Con sti tu tion” (en su ring the ri g h t ness
and fa i r ness of de ci sions)
“-li mi ta tions of juri s di c tion- con sti tu tio nal bo dies and in sti tu tions may take
de ci sions only wi t hin the sco pe of juri s di c tion spe ci fi cal ly gran ted to them by
the Con sti tu tion” (en su ring the di vi sion and ba lan ce of po wer)
“-li mi ta tions of con tents- de ci sions of pu b lic bo dies can not ex ce ed the
ma te rial li mits de te r mi ned by the Con sti tu tion” (en su ring the re spect and
ob se r van ce of the fun da men tal con sti tu tio nal rights)
Sin ce the Con sti tu tion of 1997 con ta ins pro vi sions that li mit the au t ho ri ties, it
fu l fils the re qu i re ments of li be ral con stitu tio na lism. Ho we ver, the
con stitu tiona li ty of a gi ven de mo c ra tic sy stem is not just the con tents of the
con sti tu tion but also the de gree to which its pro vi sions are re spe c ted by the
go ve r n ment. Sin ce le gi s la tion is an area whe re the de gree of un de r stan ding of
the Con sti tu tion and the wil lin g ness to ob se r ve it are cle a r ly ma ni fe sted, this
cha p ter will fo cus on the is sue of the con stitu tiona li ty of draft laws pas sed on
the ini tia ti ve of the ru ling go ve r n ment from 2005 un til 2007 (Law and Ju sti ce – 
PiS).
Be fo re we di s cuss spe ci fic le gis la ti ve pro po sals, one ob se r va tion is in or der.
The first stri king exa m p le of the government’s di s re spect for the Con sti tu tion
in fo r ce was the who le sym bo lism of the so - cal led 4th Re pu b lic. Con stan t ly
ta l king abo ut bu i l ding the “4th Re pu b lic” was evi den t ly ta r ge ted also aga inst
the text of the 1997 Con sti tu tion, which is, as its Pre a m b le sta tes, the
Con sti tu tion of the “3rd Re pu b lic”. The Law and Ju sti ce pa r ty, both be fo re and 
af ter the 2005 ele c tions, re fer red to the Con sti tu tion in an open ly ne ga ti ve way, 
which is shown by the ir pro po sals for chan ges in this fun da men tal act. The
very fact of recommending chan ges to the Con sti tu tion is no t hing wrong and it
may even be po si ti ve if it in ten si fies the pu b lic de ba te on con sti tu tio nal
mat ters. Ho we ver, at the same time, it re ve als the ne ga ti ve at ti tu de to the
Con sti tu tion of tho se who suggest the chan ges. It is the re fo re wor t hw hi le to
take a clo ser look at the chan ges pro po sed by PiS back in 2005. Here follows
a brief review of the proposals:
– In cre a sing the po wer of the Pre si dent and sym bo li cal ly ex c lu ding him from
the se pa ra tion of po wers – Trias Po li ti ca.
– The right gran ted to the Pre si dent to is sue de cre es with the fo r ce of
a par lia men ta ry act, wi t ho ut the Sejm having the po ssi bi li ty to amen d them.
– The Pre si dent ap po in ting one third of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal.
The PiS pro po sals had nu me ro us omis sions in re la tion to the Con sti tu tion.
Here are some of them:
– Omit ting the prin ci p le of not fo r cing any o ne to par ti ci pa te in re li gio us
pra cti ces.
– Si g ni fi cant li mi ta tion of the right to fre e dom of con s cien ce.
– Omit ting the gu a ran te ed sub sti tu te se r vi ce for tho se who se re li gio us
con vi c tions do not al low them to per form mi li ta ry se r vi ce. 
– Ce r ta in omis sions as to the stru c tu re of pa ren tal rights.
The PiS co a li tion pa r t ners also sub mit ted nu me ro us con sti tu tio nal
amen d ments and pro po sals. Self - De fen ce sup po r ted the stren g t he ning of the
role of the Pre si dent by sub or di na ting all exe cu ti ve po wer, in clu ding the
go ve r n ment, to him and by ve sting in him the right to ap po int the Pre si dent of
the Na tio nal Bank of Po land and by gi ving him the po ssi bi li ty to sho r ten the
term of the pa r lia ment. In the ir pro po sals, Self - De fen ce ten ded to stren g t hen
the so cial -eco no mic rights, we ake ning ot her li be r ties at the same time.
Whe re as LPR (Le a gue of Po lish Fa mi lies) pre sen ted an idea for con sti tu tio nal
chan ges pro vi ding for a se ven -y e ar term of of fi ce for the Pre si dent, cre a ting
the post of a Vice Pre si dent, im po r tant chan ges in the stru c tu re of the Se na te
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(Se na te as a cha m ber re pre sen ting the Po lish dia spo ra), and en su ring the right
to life “from the very mo ment of con ce p tion” to all. Mo re o ver, LPR, the same
as PiS, sup po r ted the in vo ca tion to God and to the Chri stian he ri ta ge of the
nation in the Preamble of the Constitution.
The re fo re, the three co a li tion pa r ties sha red com mon con sti tu tio nal ide als
which con ce r ned in cre a sing the role of the Pre si dent and li mi ting ce r ta in
con sti tu tio nal rights and fre e doms. The nu me ro us re fe ren ces to re li gio us
sym bo lism, in di ca ting that the pro po sals were dri f ting away from the prin ci p le 
of the impa r tia li ty of the sta te in re li gio us mat ters, were also significant.
This cha p ter will be a se le c ti ve and sub je c ti ve re view of ce r ta in le gis la ti ve
pro po sals of the PiS go ve r n ment from 2005 un til 2007, in clu ding tho se that
met with cri ti cism at the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal as well as ce r ta in de ci sions of
tho se ho l ding po wer, which all to ge t her form a pi c tu re of the government’s
at ti tu de to wards the Con sti tu tion. I will also draw at ten tion to ar gu ments used
be fo re the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal de fen ding the le gis la ti ve so lu tions
sup po r ted by the au t ho ri ties. Mo re o ver, em p ha sis will be pla ced on one
suc ces s ful and one un suc ces s ful at tempt to amend the Con sti tu tion.
Fre e dom of spe ech
The Con sti tu tion of the Re pu b lic of Po land en su res the fre e dom of spe ech
(Art. 54), and the fre e dom of the press (Art. 14). The Eu ro pe an Co urt of
Hu man Rights draws at ten tion to the se fre e doms, re co g ni sing them as one of
the pil lars of a de mo c ra tic so cie ty.
Ho we ver, in Po land du ring the rule of the Law and Ju sti ce pa r ty the re were
at tempts to re de fi ne the me a ning of the se fre e doms. An exa m p le of that can be
the Act on trans fo r ma tion and chan ges in the di vi sion of re spon sibi li ties and
po wers of sta te bo dies in the area of tele commu ni ca tion, ra dio and te le vi sion
bro a d ca sting, pro no un ced con tra ry to the Con sti tu tion in Art. 6 po int 1a, by the 
Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal. In this case, the le gi s la tors wan ted to em po wer the
Na tio nal Bro a d ca sting Co un cil to take ac tion with re gard to pro te c ting the
prin ci p les of jo u r na lism et hics. That me ant that the po wers of a po li ti ci sed
sta te body, which the Na tio nal Bro a d ca sting Co un cil ac tu al ly is, wo uld
in clu de set ting the stan dards of jo u r na lism et hics and en fo r cing the ob se r van ce 
of tho se prin ci p les. This au t ho ri ty co uld be used for ac tions no r mal ly
de scri bed as cen so r s hip. The ob je c tions ra i sed aga inst such a so lu tion were
re but ted by the Sejm Spe a ker with a ra t her pe cu liar ar gu ment: “ar gu ments for
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the in con for mi ty with the Con sti tu tion of the ad op ted le gis la ti ve so lu tion are
ba sed not so much on an ana ly sis of the pro vi sions of the Con sti tu tion and the
qu e stio ned act of law but ra t her on an ti ci pa tion of the Na tio nal Bro a d ca sting
Council’s ac tions and pre di c ting the ir ne ga ti ve ef fects”.1 Evi den t ly, the
Spe a ker did not re a li se that all the cri ti cism of any ne w ly in tro du ced
anti-freedom provisions must be based on such anticipation.
In fact, the ne w ly fo r med Co un cil ex pres sed the ir own con vi c tion that
pro te c tion of the fre e dom of spe ech was not go ing to be the ir prio ri ty. The
evi den ce of that were the fi nes im po sed in March 2006 on Pol sat te le vi sion and 
the Tok FM ra dio sta tions. In the opi nion of the Na tio nal Bro a d ca sting
Co un cil, the fi nes were a re spon se to the con tents which ri di cu led di sa b led
pe o p le and pra yer, in the case of Pol sat, and vio la ting the per so nal in te rests of
the Pre si dent, in the case of Tok FM. Such acts are sub ject to pe na l ty un der
Art. 18 of the Act on Ra dio and Te le vi sion Bro a d ca sting and Ar ti c les 10 and
12 of the same Act, re spec ti ve ly. With tho se ver dicts, the Co un cil gave a sign
that by pla cing the is su es of “jo u r na lism et hics” over the ir ot her
re spon sibi li ties they did not make the pro te c tion of the fre e dom of spe ech the ir
main prio ri ty. Ho we ver, it is a pro vi sion of the Con sti tu tion it self that cle a r ly
sta tes what the prio ri ties of the Na tio nal Bro a d ca sting Co un cil are: “The
Na tio nal Co un cil of Ra dio Bro a d ca sting and Te le vi sion shall sa fe gu ard the
fre e dom of spe ech, the right to in fo r ma tion as well as sa fe gu ard the pu b lic
in te rest re gar ding radio broadcasting and television” (Art. 213.1).
Ano t her thre at to the fre e dom of the press was the Vet ting Act, which was also
ap pe a led aga inst be fo re the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal. The Act tre a ted
jo u r na lists as pe o p le sub ject to the ob li ga tion to file a vet ting de cla ra tion,
un der the pain of lo sing the right to pra cti ce the ir pro fes sion. Whi le dra wing
at ten tion to the “pu b lic fun c tions” per fo r med by jo u r na lists, the Act in clu ded
this pro fes sio nal gro up into the ca te go ry of “pu b lic fi gu res”, co ve red by the
ob li ga tion to sub mit such a de cla ra tion. This me a su re had be co me the main
re a son for cri ti cism on the part of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal. Ho we ver, the
Pro se cu tor Ge ne ral, de fen ding the Act be fo re the Tri bu nal, ar gu ed that: “the
in flu en ce that me dia and in di vi du al jo u r na lists have on the pu b lic opi nion
ju sti fies the ac tions ta ken by the au t ho ri ties who aim at en su ring the pro per
et hi cal and mo ral stan dards of this gro up”.2 Such re a so ning in di ca tes that the
au t ho ri ties con si de red it a re spon sibi li ty of the sta te to en su re the et hi cal and
mo ral stan dards of the press, ob vio u s ly on the ba sis of the norms set by the
authorities themselves.
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1 Ver dict of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal of 23 March 2006, file no. K 4/06, p. 13.
2 Ver dict of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal of 11 May 2007, file no. K 2/07, p. 54.
It was also ty pi cal of the eli te in po wer un til Oc to ber 2007 to in sist on the
ex ten ded sco pe of me a ning of the term “in sult to a pu b lic fun c tio na ry”. The
bro a der the sco pe of ex pres sions fal ling into this ca te go ry was, the more
blur red the bor der be twe en such an in sult and a cri ti cism of the au t ho ri ty
be ca me. And the more blur red this bor der was, the more li mi ted the area whe re 
cri ti cism is po ssi b le was. In that case too, the Spe a ker of the Sejm re pre sen ted
a ra t her pe cu liar opi nion ac cor ding to which pu b lic fun c tio na ries de se r ve
bro a der pro te c tion of the ir di g ni ty than pri va te per sons. This, ho we ver, is
evi den t ly con tra ry to the ju di cial de ci sions of the Eu ro pe an Co urt of Hu man
Rights, ac cor ding to which the li mits of ad mis si b le cri ti cism are bro a der with
re spect to pu b lic figures than private people.
Ar ti c le 212 of the Cri mi nal Code is also very di stur bing. This pro vi sion
con si ders it il le gal to spre ad in fo r ma tion even abo ut a true ac cu sa tion if that
co uld ex po se a per son to loss of trust and hu mi lia tion. Even tho ugh only a few
pe o p le have been sen ten ced un der this Ar ti c le, as the Co un cil of Eu ro pe
Com mis sio ner for Hu man Rights sta ted, a ce r ta in “si g nal cre a ting an
at mo sp he re of fear” was sent. Ho we ver, the Po lish go ve r n ment did not seem to 
be in te re sted in ab oli s hing this provision.
The last exa m p le of the unu su al at ti tu de of the au t ho ri ties to wards the prin ci p le 
of the fre e dom of spe ech was a pro vi sion, ad op ted by the par lia men ta ry
ma jo ri ty, esta b li s hing the cri me of de fa ma tion of the Po lish na tion. The is sue
con cerns ex pres sing opi nions on the re spon sibi li ty of the Po lish na tion for
com mu nist or Nazi cri mes. No mat ter how ou tra ge o us and ab surd such cla ims
might have been, the fre e dom of spe ech sho uld also ex tend to con tro ve r sial
views. A pro vi sion of the Con sti tu tion says the fol lo wing: “Any li mi ta tion
upon the exe r ci se of con sti tu tio nal fre e doms and rights may be im po sed only
by sta tu te, and only when ne ces sa ry in a de mo c ra tic sta te for the pro te c tion of
its se cu ri ty or pu b lic or der, or to pro tect the na tu ral en vi ron ment, he alth or
pu b lic mo rals, or the fre e doms and rights of ot her per sons. Such li mi ta tions
shall not vio la te the es sen ce of fre e doms and rights” (Art. 31). This pro vi sion
le ads us to as su me that the de fa ma tion of the Po lish na tion does not in tro du ce
any of the abo ve- men tio ned con di tions and the re fo re pro hi bi ting it un der the
pain of cri mi nal lia bi li ty is con tra ry to the Con sti tu tion. It se ems that
in tro du cing such laws ai med only at enhancing the patriotic image of the
government.
The Con sti tu tio nal Or der 19
Fre e dom of as se m b ly
In Art. 57 the Con sti tu tion en su res the fre e dom of pe a ce ful as se m b ly. In this
mat ter, too, the Eu ro pe an Co urt of Hu man Rights ad op ted a very firm stan ce,
con si de ring this fre e dom very im po r tant. Ad mis si b le li mi ta tions of this
fre e dom were set forth by the Con sti tu tion and they ap p lied ma in ly to is su es
of pu b lic sa fe ty, pro te c tion of the en vi ron ment and re spe c ting the fre e dom
and mo ra li ty of ot her pe o p le. Ho we ver, a pra cti ce de ve lo ped among
au t ho ri ties which con si sted in “fin ding le gal lo o p ho les”. It was sta r ted by
Lech Ka czy ñ ski, when, be ing the ma y or of Wa r saw, he ban ned the
or ga ni sa tion of the Equ a li ty Pa ra de (Wa r saw Pri de), in vo king va rio us road
traf fic re gu la tions, whe re as the real re a son for the ban was the lack of
ap pro val of the city au t ho ri ties for the views re pre sen ted by the Parade’s
or ga ni sers, which co uld be seen from nu me ro us statements of the city hall
representatives. 
Ot hers fol lo wed that exa m p le and se ve ral ot her ci ties also ban ned ce r ta in
ma ni fe sta tions. That of ten re su l ted in il le gal as se m b lies and po li ce
in ter ven tion. Some de ci sions of mu ni ci pal au t ho ri ties, such as in Po znañ, were 
la ter con si de red il le gal. The is sue was also exa mi ned by the Con sti tu tio nal
Tri bu nal, which con de mned the pra cti ce of fin ding le gal lo o p ho les and
une qui vo cal ly sta ted that it was an ob li ga tion of the au t ho ri ties to gu a ran tee
the fre e dom of as se m b ly to eve ry o ne, re gar d less of whe t her they sha re ce r ta in
political views or not.
Ano t her in te re sting is sue was the re a c tion of the au t ho ri ties to a re mark of the
Om bu d s man who no ti ced that in the case of ce r ta in as se m b lies of re li gio us
na tu re, for in stan ce pi l gri ma ges, such me t hods had ne ver been used. The
ru ling pa r ties, using the vo i ce of the Sejm Spe a ker, se e med to ex press the view
that such as se m b lies of a re li gio us na tu re sho uld en joy a pri vi le ged sta tus
whe re as the Con sti tu tion also en su res the fre e dom of non-religious
assemblies.
Re gar ding the ban on the Equ a li ty Pa ra de, the Eu ro pe an Co urt of Hu man
Rights also ex pres sed its opi nion. It fo und the ban on the or ga ni sa tion of that
event vio la ting ce r ta in pro vi sions of the Con ven tion on Hu man Rights. The
Co urt also sta ted that the Ma y or of Warsaw’s ave r sion to “ho mo se xu al
pro pa gan da”, ex pres sed even in the press, might po int to the real re a sons
be hind his de ci sion. In spi te of the une qu i vo cal ver dict of the Eu ro pe an Co urt,
the po li ti cians of the ru ling pa r ty did not chan ge the ir views on the fre e dom of
assembly.
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The Mi ni stry of Cu l tu re and Na tio nal He ri ta ge dra f ted a law on the si tes of
na tio nal re me m bran ce sti pu la ting that at such si tes spe cial ru les wo uld be in
fo r ce, re gu la ting the or ga ni sa tion of pu b lic as se m b lies. The law was cle a r ly
de si g ned to curb the fre e dom of as se m b ly. The work on this law was
dis con ti nu ed be ca u se of early elections.
Sta te and re li gion
The is su es of the re la tion be twe en the sta te and re li gion seem to be qu i te well
and cle a r ly re gu la ted in Po land. They are go ve r ned by ce r ta in pro vi sions of
the Con sti tu tion and by the Con cor dat. Ac cor ding to the se ar ran ge ments,
Po land is a sta te of both the be lie vers and the non - be lie vers and the
au t ho ri ties re ma i nd im pa r tial as to re li gio us con vi c tions and en su re the right
to fre e dom of con s cien ce and re li gion to eve ry o ne. All of the more de ta i led
qu e stions also seem to be re gu la ted by ce r ta in en ti t le ments and rights, for
in stan ce to po ssess chu r ches or to re fu se to di s c lo se one’s re li gio us be liefs or
by ce r ta in bans, such as for in stan ce a ban to fo r ce someone to par ti ci pa te in
re li gio us pra cti ces, etc. Ge ne ral ly, the re la tions be twe en the sta te and
re li gion pre va i ling in Po land are usu al ly re fer red to as “frien d ly ne u tra li ty”.
In ac cor dan ce with this “friendly neutrality”, it should be assumed that:
– “the sta te shall not fa vo ur any re li gion as op po sed to ot her re li gions and it
shall not fa vo ur re li gion as op po sed to ana lo gi cal be ha vio ur not ba sed on
re li gio us mo ti va tion”
– “the sta te shall not sub si di se any en te r pri ses or pra cti ces who se
pre do mi na ting ob je c ti ve is of a re li gio us cha ra c ter”
– “the sta te shall not pass uni ve r sal ly bin ding laws who se only or
pre do mi na ting ju sti fi ca tion is re li gio us mo ti va tion”
– “sta te of fi cials, in con ne c tion with per fo r ming the ir sta te fun c tions, shall
not show the ir re li gio us be liefs in an osten ta tio us way and shall not
par ti ci pa te, as pu b lic fun c tio na ries, in ce re mo nies or ri tu als of a pu re ly
re li gio us nature”
– “the sta te shall not in ter fe re with is su es which con sti tu te the in ter nal af fa irs
of the chu r ches and re li gio us as so cia tions, and espe cial ly with the is su es
re la ted to of fi cial ap po in t ments wi t hin a gi ven re li gio us or ga ni sa tion”
All the abo ve prin ci p les were vio la ted du ring the Pi S - led go ve r n ment, which
can be seen by the three main examples of this vio la tion.
The Con sti tu tio nal Or der 21
Sub si di sing of re li gio us en te r pri ses and in sti tu tions by the sta te
This prin ci p le has been vio la ted in the most evi dent way in the case of sta te
bu d get ex pen di tu re for the Shri ne of God’s Pro vi den ce in Wa r saw. In the
bu d get for the year 2006 a spe ci fic pro vi sion was in clu ded in the amo unt of
20 mil lion PLN, and in the bu d get for the year 2007 – in the amo unt of
40 mil lion PLN; both amo unts were in ten ded for the Shri ne. Ex p la na tions that
sub si di sing this pro ject was re la ted to the “pro te c tion of na tio nal he ri ta ge”
seem incom pre hensi b le as it is dif fi cult to talk abo ut any he ri ta ge in the case of
so me t hing that has not been built yet.
Ano t her is sue that also se e med pro ble ma tic con ce r ned the sub si dies gran ted
by the sta te to hi g her edu ca tion in sti tu tions of a stri c t ly re li gio us cha ra c ter,
such as the Pa pal The o lo gi cal Fa cu l ty in Wroc³aw, the Je su it Uni ve r si ty of
Phi lo so p hy and Edu ca tion “Ig na tia num” in Cra cow or the Pa pal The o lo gi cal
Faculty in Warsaw.
Re li gion at scho ols
The Con sti tu tion of 1997 san c tio ned the sta tus of re li gion as an op tio nal
sub ject. Ho we ver, on 13 July 2007, the Mi ni ster of Edu ca tion, Ro man
Gie r tych, is su ed an or di nan ce which or de red that the mark in re li gion be ta ken
into ac co unt when ca l cu la ting the scho ol- le a ving ave ra ge mark. That was
equ i va lent to ma king re li gion an ob li ga to ry sub ject. The stu dents who did not
wish to at tend re li gion clas ses fa ced a dis co u ra ging pro spect of real pro blems,
for in stan ce when ap p ly ing to se con da ry scho ol. The al ter na ti ve of et hics
clas ses was only an il lu sion, be ca u se et hics clas ses are ava i la b le only in 350
out of 32,000 scho ols. Mo re o ver, some an no un ce ments ap pe a red that re li gion
might be co me one of the sub jects to be ta ken at the fi nal se con da ry scho ol
exa mi na tion. All that shows that the re qu i re ment in clu ded in the Con sti tu tion
that the rights of ot her pe o p le shall be re spe c ted in the co u r se of re li gio us
in stru c tion was vio la ted.
In ter fe ren ce of sta te au t ho ri ties with church mat ters
In Po land, the re is a prin ci p le of the impa r tia li ty of the sta te to wards the
church, which in fact me ans non -inte rfe ren ce on both si des. Ho we ver, the
events of 2006, con ne c ted with the ap po in t ment of Ar ch bi s hop Sta nis³aw
Wie l gus to the of fi ce of the Me tro po li tan Ar ch bi s hop of Wa r saw, seem to cast
a sha dow on the non -inte rfe ren ce of sta te au t ho ri ties into the in ter nal af fa irs of
the church. The unfa vou ra b le at ti tu de of the Pre si dent to wards that no mi na tion 
and the in vo l ve ment of the Om bu d s man, go ing be y ond the re spon sibi li ties of
his of fi ce, which re su l ted in can cel ling the in stal la tion of the ar ch bi s hop, ra i ses 
ce r ta in do ubts.
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Right to pri va cy
The right to pri va cy, in clu ded in the Po lish Con sti tu tion, does not al low
ga t he ring in fo r ma tion abo ut a per son be y ond what is ne ces sa ry in a de mo c ra tic 
sta te, but it also me ans the right of a per son to con trol the avai la bi li ty of this
in fo r ma tion to ot her pe o p le. This right was evi den t ly vio la ted by the Vet ting
Act, un der which the do cu ments col le c ted by the In sti tu te of Na tio nal
Re me m bran ce, con si sting, to a gre at ex tent, of the fi les of the fo r mer se cu ri ty
se r vi ces (SB), were to be po sted on the In ter net in the pu b lic do ma in. The fact
that sen si ti ve in fo r ma tion was not to be made ava i la b le does not chan ge the
fact that the Act was con tra ry to the Constitution. 
The thre at to the right to pri va cy also se ems to be as so cia ted with the un c le ar
sco pe of po wers of the re cen t ly cre a ted Cen tral Anti cor ru p tion Bu re au. The se
con cerns are con fi r med by the case of ta king over the me di cal do cu men ta tion
of the Mi ni stry of In ter ior Ho spi tal in May 2007. 
Pre su m p tion of in no cen ce
Ar ti c le 42.3 of the Po lish Con sti tu tion says: “Eve ry o ne shall be pre su med
in no cent of a cha r ge un til his gu ilt is de te r mi ned by the fi nal ju d g ment of
a co urt”. Ho we ver, the Mi ni ster of Ju sti ce, Zbi g niew Zio bro, af ter the ar rest of
a car dio- sur ge on from the Mi ni stry of In ter ior Ho spi tal, Do ctor Mi ros³aw G.,
made the fol lo wing sta te ment: “No bo dy ever is go ing to be de pri ved of life by
this man”. This sta te ment con tra dicts the abo ve qu o ted con sti tu tio nal
pro vi sion, which shows that Mi ni ster Zio bro did not fol low the rule of the
pre su m p tion of in no cen ce or ra t her, as his la ter sta te ments te sti fy, he did not
qu i te un de r stand its me a ning. The Eu ro pe an Co urt has more than once vo i ced
its opi nion on such mat ters and it has al wa ys si ded with the right to the
pre su m p tion of in no cen ce.
Ano t her thre at to the prin ci p le of the pre su m p tion of in no cen ce was the
abo ve- men tio ned Vet ting Act, sin ce un der this Act the fi les of all tho se pe o p le
that se cu ri ty se r vi ces (SB) had con si de red as the ir col la bo ra tors were to be
pu b li s hed. Such a so lu tion co uld have re su l ted in sti g ma ti sing the pe o p le
fo und in such a ca ta lo gue, which wo uld have been the equ i va lent to de pri ving
them of the right to be pre su med in no cent. The pre su m p tion of in no cen ce aims
at pro te c ting pe o p le from exa c t ly such stig ma ti sa tion and mo ral condemnation 
that follows it.
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Equ al rights
The Con sti tu tion of Po land for bids disc ri mi na tion on any gro unds and, with
the sup p le ment in the form of the Con ven tion on Hu man Rights and the
Eu ro pe an Union Cha r ter of Fun da men tal Rights, we can talk abo ut the
pro hi bi tion of disc ri mi na tion on the gro unds of sex, race, skin co lo ur,
lan gu a ge, re li gion, po li ti cal and ot her views, mem be r s hip in an et h nic
mi no ri ty, pro per ty, age, di sa bi li ty, et h nic and so cial ori gin and se xu al
orien ta tion. All ma ni fe sta tions of such disc ri mi na tion are for bid den in Po land.
Ho we ver, du ring the pe riod un der stu dy po li ti cians ho l ding pu b lic posts co uld
not un de r stand that the sta te ments they made did not con sti tu te exe r ci sing the ir 
right to fre e dom of spe ech but, be ca u se of the ir po ssi b le in flu en ce on sta te
of fi cials, such sta te ments had a spe cial cha ra c ter.
We ex pe rien ced nu me ro us exa m p les of ver bal disc ri mi na tion from tho se who
held po wer. Some ho mo p ho bic sta te ments were made by Pre si dent Lech
Ka czy ñ ski, who saw a thre at in the “ho mo se xu al pro pa gan da”. Also the
po li ti cians from LPR (Le a gue of Po lish Fa mi lies), led by the Mi ni ster of
Edu ca tion Ro man Gie r tych, made fi g h ting this “pro pa gan da” the ir chief task.
The Mi ni ster hi m self de scri bed homo sexu a li ty as “de via tion” and
“per ve r sion”. It was cha rac te ri stic for them to sup port scho ol te x t bo oks which
de scri bed homo sexu a li ty as an un na tu ral in cli na tion con ne c ted with the
inap pro pria te hie ra r chy of va lu es. Tho mas Ham mar berg, the Com mis sio ner
for Hu man Rights, fo und such a de pi c tion of homo sexu a li ty of fen si ve. In
re spon se to the Commissioner’s cri ti cism, Po lish au t ho ri ties sta ted that the ir
co un try of Chri stian ro ots can not find any un de r stan ding for un na tu ral
in cli na tions. One may say that it is, in a sen se, an ad mis sion to holding
a discriminatory stance. 
In the area of ra cial disc ri mi na tion, Po lish law has been im pe r fect for many ye ars
and it has sig nifi can t ly de pa r ted from the stan dards set by the law of the Eu ro pe an
Com mu ni ty. The PiS go ve r n ment wor ked on amen d ments to that law but the slow 
pace of tho se works also ra i sed con cern. As far as equ al rights for wo men are
con ce r ned, the ab oli tion of the of fi ce of the Go ve r n ment Ple nipo ten tia ry for the
Equ al Sta tus of Wo men and Men was ano t her ne ga ti ve sign. The De pa r t ment for
Wo men, Fa mi ly and Co m ba ting Disc ri mi na tion, cre a ted to re p la ce the
Plenipotentiary’s Of fi ce, se e med to di rect its main efforts elsewhere.
The disc rimi na to ry at ti tu de be ca me ap pa rent in a re stri c ti ve at ti tu de to abo r tion.
Un der Po lish law this pro ce du re is al lo wed only in three si tu a tions: a thre at to
the life and he alth of the mo t her, irre ver si b le da ma ge of the fo e tus, and
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a su spi cion that the pre g nan cy may be a re sult of a cri me. Ho we ver, even in the se 
si tu a tions the pro ce du re is so me ti mes una vai la b le, which has been con de mned
by the Eu ro pe an Co urt of Hu man Rights when it con si de red the case of Ali cja
Tysi¹c, who was re fu sed an abo r tion de spi te the fact that her pre g nan cy wo uld
ca u se se ve re da ma ge to her ey e sight. The unfa vou ra b le at ti tu de of the
au t ho ri ties, and in pa r ti cu lar of one of the co a li tion pa r t ners LPR, to abo r tion,
re su l ted in a si tu a tion whe re in many ca ses the au t ho ri ties re ma i ned idle when
the con sti tu tio nal rights of women in Poland were not observed.
Act on cri sis ma na ge ment
The Con sti tu tion of Po land very cle a r ly de fi nes the cha ra c ter of ex tra ordi na ry
me a su res, enu me ra ting the ir three forms: ma r tial law, a sta te of eme r gen cy or
a sta te of na tu ral di sa ster. Ho we ver, on 26 April 2007, on the government’s
ini tia ti ve, the Act on cri sis ma na ge ment was pas sed. The Act in tro du ced the
no tion of a “cri sis si tu a tion”, in which a ca ta lo gue of ac tions that the
go ve r n ment may un de r ta ke was esta b li s hed. A di stur bing aspect was that
a po ssi bi li ty to use the ar med fo r ces ap pe a red among them. Sin ce the “cri sis
si tu a tion” it self was not pre ci se ly de fi ned and the Act left it to the au t ho ri ties to 
de ci de on this mat ter, it se ems dan ge ro us that as one of the main cha rac te ri stics 
of a sta te of cri sis the Act con si ders “bre a king or da ma ging of so cial bonds”.
It may the re fo re be po ssi b le that a strong ave r sion of the so cie ty to wards the
au t ho ri ties may be iden ti fied as a sta te of cri sis. Such ar bi tra ri ness left in the
hands of the authorities raised concern.
At ti tu de to wards the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal
The main task of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal is to con trol the con fo r mi ty of
laws with the Con sti tu tion. Sin ce the pro vi sions of the Con sti tu tion are of ten
va gue, it is the Tri bu nal that must pre sent the in ter pre ta tion of the pro vi sions of 
the Con sti tu tion and ad ju di ca te abo ut the con fo r mi ty of new laws with the
Con sti tu tion. The ver dicts of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal are fi nal. That is why
very of ten the at ti tu de of the au t ho ri ties to wards the Tri bu nal re fle c ts their
at ti tu de towards the Con sti tu tion it self. In ge ne ral, the very cri ti cism of the
Tribunal’s ver dicts is not so me t hing to be con de mned. Po li ti cians ho l ding
po wer sho uld, ho we ver, avo id ma king an im pres sion that they are try ing to
exert pres su re on the Tri bu nal with the ir pu b lic sta te ments or that they are
ta king ven ge an ce, in a way, with the ir ne ga ti ve com ments on a ver dict they do
not like. And it is ce r ta in ly unac cep ta b le not to abi de by the Tribunal’s
ver dicts. The re are also some il le gal ac tions that un de r mi ne the con sti tu tio nal
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role of the Tri bu nal. They in clu de fa i lu re by the Pre si dent to sub mit mo tions
for che c king the con fo r mi ty with the Con sti tu tion when at the same time the
Pre si dent pu b li c ly ex pres ses do ubts as to the con fo r mi ty of an act with the
Con sti tu tion; of fen si ve com ments ad dres sed to the cur rent me m bers of the
Tri bu nal, fa i lu re to exe cu te the Tribunal’s de ci sions, at tempts at chan ging the
pro ce du re of ap po in ting me m bers of the Tri bu nal, etc. Du ring the Pi S - led
go ve r n ment, the following unconstitutional behaviour was observed:
The Pre si dent and the pre li mi na ry con trol
of par lia men ta ry acts 
The Con sti tu tion de fi nes en su ring the  ob se r van ce of the Con sti tu tion as one
of the pri ma ry re spon sibi li ties of the Pre si dent. For that pu r po se, the
Pre si dent has, as the main tool in his di spo sal, a po ssi bi li ty to be the first one
to send an act to be che c ked for its con fo r mi ty with the Con sti tu tion, even
be fo re si g ning it. It is in de ed his duty to do so, the re fo re if the Pre si dent,
su spe c ting the uncon sti tu tio nal cha ra c ter of an act, fa ils to send it to the
Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal, he is bre a king the law. Whi le the pre de ces sors of
Lech Ka czy ñ ski used this pro ce du re, in the pe riod un der stu dy he did not
re sort to it, not even once. Fur the r mo re, ha ving si g ned the Vet ting Act, one
of the most con tro ve r sial sta tu tes in re cent ye ars, the Pre si dent ex pres sed his
ob je c tions as to the con fo r mi ty with the Con sti tu tion of some of its parts. By
do ing this, the Pre si dent vio la ted his con sti tu tio nal du ties and sho wed lack of 
re spect for the in sti tu tion of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Of fen si ve re marks di re c ted
at the Tri bu nal and its ju d ges
Ver bal at tacks of the go ve r n ment at the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal were
nu me ro us, chie fly from the Pri me Mi ni ster Ja ros³aw Ka czy ñ ski. He ac cu sed
the Tri bu nal ju d ges of po li ti cal af fi lia tions, thre a te ned them that he wo uld look 
clo se ly at the ir life sto ries, and ac cu sed them of op po r tu nism and pla cing the
in te rests of the la wy ers abo ve the good of the sta te. The re were also some
sym bo lic af fronts such as the ab sen ce of the Pre si dent and the Pri me Mi ni ster,
con tra ry to the esta b li s hed cu stom, at the an nu al ge ne ral me e tings of the ju d ges 
of the Con sti tu tio nal Tribunal in 2006 and 2007.
Exe r ting pres su re on the Tri bu nal in or der to ob ta in a pa r ti cu lar
de ci sion
More than once the Pri me Mi ni ster exe r ted pres su re on the Tri bu nal even
be fo re it re tu r ned the ver dict, and he even thre a te ned to dis so l ve the
Tri bu nal. The best exa m p le here may be the sta te ment made be fo re the
Tri bu nal re tu r ned its ver dict on the ex pi ra tion of man da tes of the com mu ni ty
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le a ders or ma y ors. As he said, “I hope that the re will be no ci r cus le gal tricks
in the Tri bu nal”.3
Fa i lu re to car ry out the ver dicts of the Tri bu nal
Tho se in po wer have an ob li ga tion to car ry out the de ci sions of the Tri bu nal,
but at the end of the par lia men ta ry term over twen ty ver dicts of the Tri bu nal
were still wa i ting to be car ried out.
At tempts to chan ge the co m po si tion
and the pro ce du res of the Tri bu nal
In June 2007, the ru ling pa r ty pre pa red an amen d ment of the Act on the
Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal. That amen d ment wo uld, to a gre at ex tent, make the
pre si dent of the Tri bu nal de pen dent on the au t ho ri ties; the au t hors of the
amen d ment did not even hide the fact that these were the ir mo ti ves. The main
pro vi sions of the new act con ce r ned sho r te ning the President’s term to three
ye ars and in tro du c ing an ob li ga tion to con si der the ca ses in the or der of the ir
sub mis sion. Tho se so lu tions wo uld, in an ob vio us way, make the Tri bu nal
pre si dent po li ti cal ly de pen dent and wo uld make it im pos si b le to tre at ce r ta in
par ticu la r ly ur gent ca ses as a prio ri ty. If ad op ted, the amen d ment wo uld
we aken the role of the Tri bu nal and wo uld de pri ve it of its independence.
Pas sing le gi s la tion con tra ry to the esta b li s hed line of ju di cial
de ci sions of the Tri bu nal
Con s cio us ly pro po sing acts con tra ry to the pre vio u s ly esta b li s hed line of
ad ju di ca ting of the Tri bu nal is con tra ry to the Con sti tu tion. And that was
exa c t ly what hap pe ned in the case of the Vet ting Act of Oc to ber 2006, whe re
the de fi ni tion of col la bo ra tion with the se cu ri ty se r vi ce (SB) was de fi ned in
a much bro a der sen se, a sen se which had been re je c ted ea r lier by the
Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal and which sig nifi can t ly na rro wed the me a ning of
collaboration.
Ap po in ting me m bers of the con sti tu tio nal bo dies
In Po land, a cu stom has been esta b li s hed ac cor ding to which in ap po in ting the
me m bers of bo dies with more than a one - pe r son mem be r s hip, who se me m bers
are pro po sed by the pa r lia ment or the Pre si dent, the ru ling fo r ce tries to sha re
the mem be r s hip with the op po si tion. In the two main bo dies, the Na tio nal
Bro a d ca sting Co un cil and the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal, this prin ci p le,
pre vio u s ly ob se r ved, was aban do ned un der the rule of the Pi S - led go ve r n ment. 
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3 “Ga ze ta Wy bo r cza” 13 March 2007.
Only the can di da tes of the ru ling co a li tion were ap po in ted to tho se bo dies.
A si mi lar key to fil ling the of fi cial posts co uld be ob se r ved in the case of the
Co un cil of the In sti tu te of Na tio nal Re me m bran ce or the pre si dent of the
Na tio nal Bank of Po land. In ad di tion, in the lat ter case, the pa r ty ap po in t ment
co in ci ded with the considerable incompetence of the candidate.
Amen ding the Con sti tu tion
A ce r ta in va lue of the cur rent con sti tu tion, al t ho ugh not an ab so lu te va lue, is its 
per ma nen ce. Re co g ni sing the su per io ri ty of the Con sti tu tion sho uld the re fo re
ma ni fest it self in the as su m p tion of its prin ci pal un chan gea bili ty. The chan ges
sho uld only be made in ex ce p tio nal si tu a tions. In this area, the Pi S - led
go ve r n ment exe r ci sed some re stra i nt, by pro po sing amen d ments to the
Con sti tu tion only twi ce and in tro du cing such a chan ge only once. The chan ge
that was in tro du ced made it po ssi b le for Po land to ad opt the law on the
Eu ro pe an Ar rest War rant, which re mo ves the ab so lu te con sti tu tio nal ban on
the ex tra di tion of Po lish ci ti zens. The ne ces si ty to im p le ment that chan ge was
si g nal led by the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal, so the Pre si dent sub mit ted a draft
amen d ment of the Con sti tu tion, ad op ted by the Sejm, with mi nor chan ges,
with the sup port of a la r ge, cros s- pa r ty ma jo ri ty. It is con si de red an exe m p la ry
de mo c ra tic action in the area of constitutional amendments.
The si tu a tion was dif fe rent in the case of the ot her pro po sed chan ge. That
chan ge in vo l ved in tro du cing an amen d ment to the Con sti tu tion on pro te c ting
life “from the mo ment of con ce p tion” and was di re c ted aga inst the
libe ra li sa tion of the abo r tion law in the fu tu re. In fact, ho we ver, it was, to
a large degree, a mat ter of to u g he ning the le gal sta tus. Dif fe rent pro po sals for
that amen d ment ra i sed many con tro ve r sies and di s cus sions. Even tu al ly, all
five drafts sub mit ted to vote were re je c ted. That amen d ment was lost, to a gre at 
ex tent, be ca u se of a gre at nu m ber of si mi lar, more co m pro mi sing ide as. They
were sub mit ted both by the Pre si dent and the Pri me Mi ni ster. It can be
as su med that sub mit ting tho se drafts ai med at re lie ving the ten sion ari sing
from the ori gi nal pro po sal. Such ac tions sho uld be co un ted as positive moves
of the government.
Con c lu sions
An ala r ming con c lu sion from the abo ve di s cus sion is an ob se r va tion that in the 
pe riod un der stu dy the PiS go ve r n ment, in a nu m ber of its le gis la ti ve and
exe cu ti ve ac tions, ex pres sed its ir re ve rent at ti tu de to wards the Con sti tu tion in
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fo r ce. As far as the acts of the pa r lia ment are con ce r ned, the di s re spect for the
Con sti tu tion was the most vi si b le in the case of:
– the Vet ting Act (in frin ging on the ci vil li be r ties, the right to pri va cy, the
right to the pre su m p tion of in no cen ce and ot hers)
– Act on the trans fo r ma tion and chan ges in the di vi sion of re spon sibi li ties and 
po wers of the sta te bo dies in the area of tele commu ni ca tion, ra dio and
te le vi sion bro a d ca sting (in frin ging on the fre e dom of the press and vio la ting 
the re gu la tions on the po wers of the Pre si dent)
– Act on cri sis ma na ge ment (al lo wing ac tions that might lead to re stri c ting the 
con sti tu tio nal rights and fre e doms)
– acts di re c t ly sub si di sing re li gio us en te r pri ses and in sti tu tions
– an no un ce ments of chan ges in the Act on the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal
(sub or di na ting the Tri bu nal to the exe cu ti ve au t ho ri ty)
The re were also ac tions vio la ting the Con sti tu tion but not ha ving a sta tu to ry
na tu re, and the re fo re not sub ject to the con trol of the Con sti tu tio nal Tri bu nal.
Tho se in clu ded:
– ho sti le com ments of pe o p le ho l ding po wer di re c ted at the Con sti tu tio nal
Tri bu nal
– dis cri mina to ry re marks ad dres sed to ce r ta in ca te go ries of ci ti zens
– the President’s ne glect of the ob li ga tion to ini tia te the pro cess of
con sti tu tio nal con trol in ca ses when the re were su spi cions that an act of
pa r lia ment may be uncon sti tu tio nal
– sta te ments vio la ting the prin ci p le of the pre su m p tion of in no cen ce
– ap po in ting re pre sen tati ves of only one pa r ty to fill the va can cies in the
col le c ti ve con sti tu tio nal bo dies
– sta te ments and pe na l ties si g ni fy ing the re stri c tion of the fre e dom of spe ech
– fa i ling to en su re ap pel la te pro ce du res in si tu a tions when it was im pos si b le
to exe cu te one’s con sti tu tio nal rights
– a c tions vio la ting the prin ci p le of the impa r tia li ty of sta te au t ho ri ties to wards 
re li gion
De mo c ra cy must find the ba lan ce be twe en the “rule of the ma jo ri ty” and
“con stitu tio na lism”. Brie fly spe a king, tho se who are in ma jo ri ty are sup po sed
to rule but on the ba sis of ce r ta in esta b li s hed, un chan gea b le and re spe c ted
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ru les. Unfo rtu na te ly, be twe en 2005 and 2007, de mo c ra cy in Po land was
un de r sto od by the au t ho ri ties only in a ma jo ri ta rian way, using the “win ner
ta kes all” prin ci p le, with no re spect for the ot her ele ment, con stitu tiona li ty,
un de r sto od in a li be ral man ner, i.e. esta b li s hing a strict fra me work which must
be re spe c ted by the will of the ma jo ri ty.
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Wies³aw Staœkiewicz
The Legislative Process
The sovereign of a Commonwealth, be it an assembly or
one man, is not subject to the civil laws. For having
power to make and repeal laws, he may, when he
pleaseth, free himself from that subjection by repealing
those laws that trouble him, and making of new….
               Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan
Introduction
In this chapter, I will analyse the legislative activity of the 5th Term of the Sejm
(from 19 October 2005 to 10 July 2007). An attempt will be made to compare
this activity with the analogical activity of the Sejm of earlier terms. An
important question will be asked whether the activities of the Sejm in those two
years became an inherent part of the programme of social reform included in the
project proclaimed by the Law and Justice party “The 4th Republic”. 
By way of introduction, certain features characteristic of the legislative
activity of the Polish parliament of all terms from 1989 should be presented.
They include the following:
– A vast majority of draft laws were prepared by the members of parliament.
The government, also authorised to submit draft laws, submitted a minority of 
them, which may have been caused by the frequent changes of government. 
– The legislative work of the Sejm was usually more transparent than that of
the government.
– There was little interference of the government with making laws in the
Sejm.
– Both the government and the parliament never presented a broader plan of
legislative works.
– The Polish parliament assumed, as its main responsibility, writing and
changing the drafts of laws, which led to a situation when on the forum of
the Sejm purely technical aspects of regulations consumed most of the time,
whereas an ordinary discussion on the aims and effects of the acts of
parliament seemed to be of secondary importance.
– Quite often, the Sejm committees and sub-committees, because of their
fragmentation, had a negative influence on the legislative process.
– The role of the Senate in the legislative process seemed to be pointless and
the Senate itself often appeared as a place of obtaining a “second chance” for 
pushing an act through the parliament. 
– There was sporadic participation of experts in the legislative process.
– The low level of legal knowledge and culture of some members of parliament
had a negative influence on the quality of draft laws proposed by the Sejm.
– After the initial period of creating new laws, which was a necessity related
to the economic and political transformation shaping Polish reality after
1989, it was followed by a phase of amendments. On average, 60% of acts of 
parliament were amendments.
– The one-element (act of parliament) model of the sources of law system
prevailed.
– Legislation in Poland was not properly supervised. There were no
appropriate publications and institutions to deal with it.
– The system of regulations pertaining to legislative work in Poland was
rather poor, which was evident in the lack of testing whether a given law
would function properly. That resulted in some unusual situations when
works were carried out on amendments to a law that had not even come into
force. The attitude of the members of parliament themselves was not
appropriate, either. They did not attach a lot of importance to the obligation
to assess the economic, social and legal impact of an act of law, an
obligation which was imposed by the Sejm By-Laws.
Law making 2005–2007
For many years, the Polish legislative process has been revealing numerous
symptoms of being dysfunctional. However, this has acquired a certain
32 Wies³aw Staœkiewicz
specific character during the 5th Term of the Sejm (2005–2007). An analysis
of this issue should start with an analysis of the draft laws.
During the 5th Term, until 10 July 2007, 655 draft laws were submitted to the
Sejm Speaker. The government submitted 344 drafts, which accounted for
52.5% of all drafts. The government drafts mainly constituted amendments
(64.6%). Ratifications accounted for 9.6% of government drafts, and
comprehensive drafts amounted to 24.2%. The rest were drafts concerning the
budget and changes to the status of state schools and colleges. Comparing
these figures with previous terms of the parliament, one can clearly see that the
legislative revolution announced by PiS never took place. 
Until July 2007 there were 261 drafts submitted by members of parliament,
which accounts for 39.9% of all submitted draft laws. Together with drafts
submitted by the Sejm committees, they accounted for 41.4%. (Apart from
that, the President submitted 19 drafts, the Senate 13, and the citizens 8, which
accounts for 2.9%, 1.8%, and 1.1% of all submitted drafts, respectively.) Out
of those 261 drafts, 240 were amendments, which is 92%. Most of those
amendments, as well as the comprehensive drafts submitted by members of
parliament, were in fact implementations of government proposals. The main
examples are draft laws: on amending the act on the National Radio and
Television Broadcasting Council, the Vetting Act, the Election Law for local
government elections, the act on family benefits, and others.
Until 4 September 2007, the number of drafts submitted by members of
parliament increased to 347. The following drafts were submitted by
individual parties: PiS deputies – 106 drafts, PO (Citizens’ Platform) deputies
– 66 drafts, SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) deputies – 60 drafts, Self-Defence 
deputies – 64 drafts, LPR (League of Polish Families) deputies – 61 drafts, and
PSL (Polish Peasants’ Party) deputies – 41 drafts. It is perplexing that the
number of drafts submitted by the largest opposition party, PO, was so small. It 
may be explained by the Sejm Speaker’s policy of delaying the drafts.
It should be noted that the Sejm of the 5th Term, during its last two sessions
(just before the early elections) passed 48 acts, whose cost has been estimated
by experts to be 20 billion PLN. Or that means that during one session the acts
were passed which consumed approximately 10% of the state budget. 
Within the period under study, 353 acts of parliament were passed, which is
similar or higher than the number of acts passed in the corresponding periods
during previous terms. Most of them, as much as 68.5%, were amendments of
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the acts that were already in force, and 10% were ratifications of international
agreements. Thus only every fifth act adopted by the Sejm in the period under
study may be treated as a comprehensive act of law. The 311 acts, excluding
the ratifications, concerned primarily:
– economy and agriculture, together with tax matters and financial regulations 
as well as ownership regulations (118 acts)
– central administration institutions (52 acts, including 22 applying to broadly 
understood administration of justice)
– social policy of the state (47 acts)
– state security and state security institutions (27 acts)
– education and culture (17 acts)
– current organisational activities, such as road building, environmental
protection, etc. (14 acts)
– changes to codes (14 amendment acts)
– local government matters (6 acts)
Out of all those acts, 20% were the 63 acts passed in order to “implement the
laws of the European Union”. It was the government’s obligation to have those 
acts passed.
Looking at this data, it can be concluded that there was a significant growth in
the percentage of acts pertaining to the economy, agriculture and public
finance (38.6% of all acts in the 5th Term and 22.7% in the 4th Term).
Furthermore, there was a tendency towards increasing the percentage of laws
regulating the shape of the central administration and state security
institutions, which allows us to talk of statist legislation. Unfortunately, there
was no indication of any systemic reform, as there were no comprehensive
laws referring to the reform of public finance, the healthcare service, the
retirement system or the economy. 
A closer look at the legislative activity of the Sejm lets us make the following
observations regarding the characteristics of the legislative process:
Superficial legislation
During the period under study, the superficial nature of a number of acts meant
that they only touched upon the surface of a problem, without delving into its
essence. As a result, there were acts that only apparently addressed the
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problem while in reality they promoted certain political interests. As an
example of such an act we can refer to the Act on 24-hour courts (more about it
in Chapter V).
Lack of acts introducing comprehensive reforms
The flagship PiS slogan of the “solidarity-based state” seemed to announce
a programme of carefully thought-through comprehensive reforms. Whereas
the main objection against the government was exactly the lack of serious
reforms important for the society, such as social policy, healthcare system or
the retirement system.
Lack of interest in the codification and unification of the system
of law
This objection may be raised both against the PiS government as well as
against the parliaments and governments of the previous years. That, however, 
does not make the objection less serious.
Religious bias in making laws
This issue is very sensitive as it applies mainly to the questions of religious
beliefs and ideology. These areas found their voice heard several times in the 5th 
Term. It is enough to give an example of the case of the protection of life from
conception or the vetting disputes. A significant problem appeared when some
acts were intentionally highlighted as being ideologically significant. Such
a situation put pressure on the opposition, who became capable of accepting
a bill, even in spite of certain constitutional objections. Nobody wanted to
become, for instance, an enemy of settling the accounts with the past.
Legislative procedures
Between 2005 and 2007 the procedures of passing the laws were notoriously
circumvented. Here are some examples:
The role of the Speaker
In general, the responsibilities of the Speaker include both ensuring the good
quality of the draft laws and submitting the drafts to the parliamentary debate.
In this latter task, he or she should take into account the preference for
government drafts: he or she cannot, however, fail to submit to debate the
drafts submitted by members of parliament. Whereas in the Polish parliament
of the 5th Term, certain drafts never became official Sejm documents, for
reasons which were probably purely political rather than formal. As a result,
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certain drafts waited very long to be considered, which is explained by
numerous expert analyses, yet some doubts remain as to the complete
impartiality of the Speaker.
Obstructing of the budget bill from passing
In the case of works on the budget bill the problem was often the election date
and the lack of time left after the elections to complete all the work. However,
the whole atmosphere of the budget work in 2005 seemed exceptional. For the
first time, the Speaker of the Sejm, in conjunction with the ruling party, tried to 
impede the work of the parliament to give the President a tool to threaten the
parliament with dissolution and early elections.
Circumventing the Sejm by-laws 
In the case of the Act on the National Council for Radio and Television
Broadcasting, the Speaker reconvened the Sejm in order to repeat the vote that
had just been completed and the different attendance brought in effect different 
voting results.
Putting undue pressure on deputies
The term of the parliament under study was full of ad personam attacks on the
“enemies” of certain laws, which were at that particular moment forced
through the parliament by the parliamentary majority. Frequently, those
attacks were even directed at the Sejm experts when their opinions were not in
line with the views of the supporters of a given law.
Short-cutting the legislative process
That tendency was clearly seen in the 5th Term and its culmination was the
“Solidarity-based State” Committee, which considered the drafts using the
fast-track procedure. Such an acceleration of the works resulted in
lower-quality laws.
Assessment and the justification for draft laws
In generall, every draft needs to be accompanied by a justification, including,
among others, a calculation of the costs of its implementation. Those
justifications were notoriously neglected and full of errors.
Lack of clearly defined party objectives and a lack of social policy
Due to the fact that the social objectives were not precisely defined, the works
on the acts of law were chaotic and fruitless. Moreover, the Polish
parliamentary system was lacking clearly defined social objectives in that
period. 
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Domination of the legislative process by sectoral interests
The responsibility for preparing government drafts lied with individual
ministries, which led to the appearance of drafts that in fact promoted the
interests of the ministry. The structures responsible for overseeing the
preparation of draft laws in the government were passive and inconsistent. The 
procedures of preparing legislative proposals by the government lacked
transparency. There was no quality control and their political character was
sometimes only too evident. 
Infringements of the rule of law
This had two dimensions in this term of the Sejm. The first dimension
concerned the instrumental use of the law and its interpretation, which resulted 
in circumventing the law. The second dimension concerned failing to
recognise the legal principles as binding, and limiting the law to rules, that is
to the literal wording of legal provisions. That led to the improper treatment of
the Constitution only as a set of rules which could be used on the basis of their
linguistic and logical interpretation. 
Lack of debate
During the 5th Term, the law making process lacked sufficient debate of
legislative proposals as legislation was rushed through the parliament. 
Conclusions
The activity of the Sejm of the 5th Term was focused too much on the past.
It was mainly concerned with the issues of settling accounts with the past and
there was no room for solving the problems of everyday life. Such urgent
issues as constructing highways, repairing the healthcare and pension system,
or improving the operation of courts were not solved.
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Rados³aw Markowski
The Party System
What is the “party system” and what are its indicators?
The period of two years is too short for any fundamental changes of a party
system to take place. That is why this analysis will cover the whole time of the
Polish political transformation from 1989 to 2007, although with particular
attention paid to the years 2005–2007, that is the rule of Law and Justice (PiS).
In the case of Poland the term party system is rather a conventional term, as this 
system does not show the features that should be characteristic of model party
systems. Instead, we should talk about a group of parties in Poland rather than
about a party system.
The existence of political parties is an important prerequisite for the proper
functioning of democracy. In a democracy, the parties which win the elections
obtain the legitimacy to rule. There is a possibility of a one-party or coalition
rule. The aim of political parties is to participate in the government. Party
systems, by their very nature, must select the winners on the basis of the
election law. An institutionalised party system is characterised by the
following:
– The parties should be autonomous, also with respect to the institutions
which helped create them, such as the church or the trade unions.
– The parties should be rooted in the society, which means that the voters of
a certain party represent a certain social class, stratum or group.
– The parties should be independent from their charismatic leaders and should 
exist on the political scene for a long time. The issues of leadership in the
parties should be regulated by rational-bureaucratic criteria.
– The parties and their members recognise elections as the only way to decide
who is going to take power in the country. 
– The key relations among the parties are stable and their programmes are
predictable. Multi-party coalitions, therefore, become permanent and their
repeatability provides predictability to the party system.
According to Peter Mair, a scholar working on party systems, an
institutionalised party system is a system with permanent, predictable and
routine patterns of competition and political alliances. Many other experts also 
point to stability as an important factor which makes it possible to better
explain and predict political phenomena. However, there still remains the
problem of establishing the period of unchangeability of a certain parameter,
which is necessary to consider something stable. It has been agreed that we can 
take into account three measurements of one parameter, and that allows us to
talk about relative stability. In the case of politics, this parameter would be an
electoral and term cycle. Since the elections of 2005, which were the fifth fully
democratic parliamentary elections in turn and the fourth democratic
presidential elections, we can talk about a certain permanence of political
phenomena in Poland. 
An assessment of a party system must focus on the quantitative approach. The
main features and quantitative indicators of the institutionalisation of the party
system are the following:
– the so-called “effective number of parties”
– fractionalisation of the party system
– measure of the proportionality of the party system
– the percentage of the so-called “wasted votes” in the elections
– the sum of all votes and mandates won in a given election by the two largest
parties
– the level of the so-called “electoral changeability”, that is the degree of
instability of electoral preferences of the voters, measured both at the
aggregate level and individually. 
These indicators make it possible to assess the stability of a system, its
representativeness, the level of consensus capabilities of political elites, and
also the potential to form coalition governments.
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The Polish party system
Using the above criteria, it should be stated that as of 2007 there is no party
system in Poland. A number of facts can point to that:
– Constant changes of the election law in the years 1989–2005. 
– In 2007 there was only one party that existed back in 1991 – the Polish
Peasants Party (PSL).
– In the years 1991–2007 no government of the same partisan configuration
ruled twice.
– Leaders of most of the parties lent their image to promote a number of
different parties and electoral coalitions.
– In Poland there is a great electoral changeability, which is a symptom of the
lack of social roots of the parties. At the aggregate level, between the years
2001 and 2005 the change of political party support amounted to 38%,
whereas in Western Europe the same indicator reached approximately 9%.
Furthermore, in 2005 as many as 63% of Poles cast their votes for a different 
party than four years before, and as many as 28% changed their preferences
en bloc, that is from left-wing to right-wing parties or vice versa.
– A peculiar trait of Poland was also a very low turnout in previous elections.
While in Western Europe the turnout was about 75%, in Poland it oscillated
around 40%–50%.
As a result of that, the winner of the parliamentary elections in 2005, that is the
Law and Justice party, won the support of only 10.54% of eligible voters.
The above facts indicate that in Poland we cannot talk about a party system but
rather about a group of parties fighting for voters. The indicators showing the
electoral instability may indirectly reflect the level of disappointment of Poles
with politics and may explain the low election turnout. The turnout in Poland is 
so low that it is casting one’s vote should be treated as deviation and not, as in
other countries, abstaining from voting. The non-voting group has become so
large that it is difficult to point out any specific features of that group and it is
an arduous task to explain the turnout difference between Poland and Western
European democracies (the difference of 30–40%) or Eastern European
democracies (here the difference is about 20%).
The responsibility for this situation should fall on the political elites which in
Poland are subject to constant movement, which confuses many voters.
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Political parties are forming, merging, changing their names and politicians
(especially before elections), and changing their political affiliations. In
addition, Polish political parties have always been under the greater influence
of non-political institutions than it was the case in other countries of the region. 
A good example is the influence of the Catholic Church on Polish political life, 
which may partly explain the lack of a systemic character of political parties in
Poland. Other possible reasons are suggested by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.
In their opinion, young democracies, which previously had a highly mobilised
“alternative society”, i.e. a society with the traditions of social resistance to the
political sphere, may have problems with transforming that opposition’s
excessive mobilisation into an institutionalised civil society and a legitimate
political community. Such suppositions may be confirmed by the fact that
stable institutionalised party systems exist in Hungary and in the Czech
Republic where the mobilisation of the society against the communist regime
was significantly lower. 
Another specific feature of the Polish political sphere is the reference of the
voters to various issues that they consider important when making their choice
as to which party to support. The majority of Poles do not vote considering the
issues such as the economy, unemployment, the privatisation policy or social
security. The factors determining whether a voters casts their vote for the
left-wing or for the right-wing party usually remains in the sphere of culture
and society: the issue of their attitudes to abortion, to the role of the church and
to the communist legacy.
The results of the 2005 elections
After the 2005 elections, the spectacular victory of PiS was often mentioned.
One should, however, remember that only one in ten Poles eligible to vote
supported PiS, which is a very poor result. Those elections showed that the
parties do not have any stable electorate, which was indicated by the level of
electoral changeability, although it is interesting that the six parties that made
it to the Sejm were the same parties that managed to do that in the elections of
2001. An analysis of the 2005 elections also revealed that there was
a difference in the profiles of the voters of the two major parties. Namely, PiS
attracted more people with a low level of education, older and living in rural
areas than the Citizens’ Platform (PO). Furthermore the research done on the
2005 election results showed that the PiS voters were religious, poor and held
less prestigious positions on the labour market. PiS had the greatest support in
south-eastern Poland, which has always been home to the electorate of the
Polish right. The PO voters were just the opposite – they were well off,
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moderately religious and came mainly from larger cities. Its main centres of
support were located in north-western Poland, and the party won with a great
majority in all regions populated by national minorities. In addition, the areas
where PO won greater support are the regions with a much higher GDP
indicator than the regions where PiS won. Those visible regional differences,
do not, however, authorise a theory of the two Polands: an eastern one
supporting PiS and the western one supporting PO. There is rather one Poland
– one reluctant to participate in elections. 
A comparison of the results of the elections of 2001 and 2005 indicates that the
parties have electorates that are more internally coherent, and the main axis of
competition between the parties is more strongly defined by economic issues.
This contributes to a greater clarity of the electoral system. It should, however,
be remembered that in 2005 PiS was able to retain only 64% of its voters from
2001, and PO retained only 44%.
The years 2005–2007 and political parties
As a result of the early elections in 2007 no new political force appeared which
would be able to exceed the 5% threshold, which testifies to the organisational
stability of the political parties. The election results reveal, however, that the
electorate was not stable. As studies show, in the years 2005–2007, the
electorate of PiS became much older and less educated than in 2005. Among
Poles in the age group of 18–24 years, only 16% wanted to vote for PiS in
2007, whereas in 2005 this figure was 27%. In 2007 the group of citizens over
60 years of age who declared voting for PiS was 36%, whereas in 2005 it was
29%. In the case of PO there was a reverse process. Among the youngest
voters, their support for PO rose from 33% to 44%, and among the oldest it fell
from 17% to 13%. Furthermore, people with an elementary education reduced
their support for PO from 13% to 10%, and people with a higher education
increased their support from 37% to 45%.
The data on the declared transfer of voters’ allegiances is also worth
mentioning. In the case of the two largest parties (PiS and PO), only 45% of
those who voted for PiS in 2005 intended to do so in 2007, whereas PO
managed to retain 57% of its voters from 2005. As it can be seen, PiS lost many 
more supporters than PO and it lost them mainly to PO. 
Over those two years the parties themselves changed from the point of view of
their programme. PiS moved from a conservative position to a populist-
-nationalist stance. PO partly lost its liberal character diluting into a range of
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programme proposals, from conservative, Christian-democratic to social-
-democratic. The greatest, however, were the changes undergone by PSL. Its
centrist moderation, opening towards the European Union and proposed
substantive programme discourse won the new urban elector for this party.
What should be done?
All the above-mentioned facts indicate the instability of the Polish “party
system”. Can anything be done about it? The election law certainly should not
be changed from the current proportionate one to majority elections with
one-mandate electoral districts, because that would only be conducive to
political corruption. The main issue worth focusing on is the problem of
recruiting candidates to politics and allowing new people to enter politics in
Poland. There is also a need to change the way politics is discussed and,
especially for academics and experts, to shift from axiological-legal language
to economic-empirical discourse, since the more the neutral knowledge of the
political economy influences political decisions, the better the quality of
politics is. 
Conclusions
There are a number of factors which prevent us from talking about a party
system in Poland. As it can be seen from the period under study, the main
reason for that is the great instability of the parties themselves and of the
voters’ preferences. The factors influencing this are: imperfect election laws
and politicians who amend these laws to promote their own particularistic
interests, non-charismatic party leaders and disloyal politicians who often
change their party affiliations. As a result, the election turnout is low. Poles do
not trust unstable political parties that are indecisive in their programmes and
they prefer not to participate in elections. A bi-polar order has appeared, with
the two largest competing parties (PO and PiS). This could be treated as
a positive sign of stabilisation, but one may doubt, however, if such an
alternative will improve the accountability of the political system. 
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Krzysztof Burnetko
Public Administration
The so-called 4th Republic (a new era after the electoral victory of Law and
Justice) strongly negated the concept of civil service, that is professional and
non-party public administration. The reason for that was the negative attitude
of the government to the institutions of the 3rd Republic (the order created
after the transformation from the communism to democracy after 1989).
Furthermore, under the PiS-led government official appointments were treated 
as a form of a bonus for political loyalty and as jobs providing income to
friends and family members. 
Opening balance
The public administration of European states is based on the civil service
model, defined by the six Nolan Principles, which refer to selflessness,
integrity, objectivity, accountability, honesty and openness.
All political forces in Poland after 1989 declared that they would build public 
administration on the basis of the civil service model. However, the promises 
to build a corps of professional, non-party civil servants were never fulfilled.
The first law on the civil service appeared only in 1996, however, already in
1998 a new one was passed, which did not change the fact that even that new
law was notoriously violated. The governments of both sides of the political
scene appointed “their own people” to the posts. Some governments were
more ashamed to do that, as for instance the AWS (Solidarity Election
Action) government of Jerzy Buzek, while others, such as Leszek Miller’s
left-wing government, openly admitted it. The Civil Service Act was
breached and sometimes there were attempts to circumvent it, for instance,
by changing the status of some public offices so that the civil service
requirements did not apply to them. The bodies, such as the Civil Service
Council, whose role was to protect the position of the civil service, were
regularly ignored. One of the brighter moments was the government of
Marek Belka, which at least introduced an open system of recruitment to
public administration. After that the programme for the 4th Republic,
announced by Law and Justice in 2005, brought promises of radical changes
in public administration
Civil Service as the “uk³ad” – the network
of connections
During the elections campaign in 2005, Law and Justice promised to crash the
pathologies of the 3rd Republic, carry out a “moral revolution” and build
a “strong state”, called the 4th Republic. PiS treated the public administration
as an element of the mythical network blooming in the interest of influential
groups and elites of the 3rd Republic. That was why, immediately after taking
power, it promised a radical reform of the administration. In the stabilisation
pact concluded between PiS and its coalition partners, a provision appeared on
regulating the civil service and the competition procedure, and, more
specifically, about introducing a possibility of a “free flow of qualified
officials between the human resources of public administration officials,
officials of the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK), local government officials 
and members of the civil service corps and other similar resources and about
a change of the principles of holding competitions for positions in public
administration and other state-owned corporate persons”. However, it soon
turned out that those in power had a completely different attitude to the
apolitical nature of public administration. Numerous statements of key PiS
politicians testify to that, such as the one made by Ludwik Dorn, who, as the
Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration, in November 2005, stated that 
civil service “should be a group of competent but also politically loyal
officials”, or that of Marek Kuchciñski, who, as a deputy chairman of the
PiS Parliamentary Group, stated that “officials are expected to carry out the
policy of the government, because the government has the assent of the
Parliament and the President to implement the policy of the state”. Civil
service members at the time were often offended. PiS politicians accused
them, first of all, of being appointed by the SLD, but they were not spared
some more drastic offences, either (e.g. Ludwik Dorn said that they were
mostly drunks).
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Changes in legal regulations applying to public
administration
PiS started, therefore, to introduce legal changes according to its vision of
how public service should operate. First, the Act on public service was
amended, which opened a possibility to transfer the staff of the Supreme
Board of Supervision (NIK) and the local government officials to work in the 
government administration. It is significant that President Lech Kaczyñski
used to be the Chairman of the Supreme Board of Supervision and later the
Mayor of Warsaw. Then, on 24 August 2006, the Act on Civil Service and
the Act on the National Executive Personnel Pool were pushed through the
Sejm. Those acts abolished the competition procedure in the recruitment to
managerial posts in government administration. However, the number of
posts covered by the Act was greater than it seemed, because it amounted to
over 2000 posts. Candidates to those posts were to be recruited from the
National Personnel Pool (PZK), from which ministers or directors general of
ministries and heads of offices were expected to draw their officials. They
could also be dismissed without any formalities. Anybody with the
appropriate length of experience and having passed the appropriate
examinations could get into the Pool but there was nothing in the law about
political neutrality of the PZK members. In addition, the acts abolished the
post of the Head of the Civil Service Office. The responsibilities of the Office 
were taken over by the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, which would thus
assume supervision over the 120,000 people from the civil service corps. The 
newly introduced laws were again amended in May 2007. As a result of those 
amendments the group of people eligible to be in the National Personnel Pool 
increased and the list of institutions whose heads did not have to be appointed 
by way of a competition procedure were extended. All that significantly
narrowed the public service and practically limited the application of its rules 
only to the medium-level posts.
The practice of recruitment and filling the posts
After PiS took power in 2005 numerous personnel changes took place. Their
number indicated that we could talk about purges. The leader in personnel
changes was the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration and the
Ministry of Labour. The imperfection of the new law and doubts as to its
conformity with the Constitution left room for numerous manipulations. In
that way, after some quick appointments, several activists connected with
Self-Defence became eligible for PZK.
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However, the best evidence of the political approach of the government to
filling official posts could be the speed with which the appointees of
Self-Defence and LPR were losing their posts at the moment of the political
crisis. They were obviously replaced by people connected with PiS.
Possible consequences of the functioning of public
administration and the perception of political elites
One result of such an approach of the government to public administration was 
the lower quality of work of that administration. The degree of the officials’
servility also increased as the officials hoped to obtain further appointments
from the authorities to whom they had been loyal. Eventually, the prestige of
the public administration itself fell as it started to appear as a place of party
scrambles. However, the worst effect of the political approach to
administration by Law and Justice may be the lack of trust of the new ruling
team (PO and PSL) in a large group of public officials. Due to the elections in
October 2007, in the near future there will probably be new purges (promises
of “cleaning up” after PiS), and thus this very negative cyclical character of
a re-shuffle among the public administration personnel will not only continue
but it will also become a binding custom.
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The Justice System
Introduction
Gaining control over the justice system was one of the priorities of the Law and 
Justice party (PiS), which assumed power in 2005. The position of the Minister 
of Justice was filled by one of the closest associates of Lech and Jaros³aw
Kaczyñski, Zbigniew Ziobro, the man who, at the very beginning of his term in 
office, presented 23 draft laws expected to revolutionise the justice system.
Did a revolution really take place? What follows is an analysis of the
institutional issues related to the justice system in the years 2005–2007.
The prosecution
An analysis of the functioning of the prosecution service may deal either with
the changes in the legislation applying to the prosecution service or with its
day-to-day operations. The legislative solutions adopted by the Sejm, as well
as the fact of using the prosecution service in political actions, deprived the
service of its independence.
The Act dated 29 March 2007 amending the Act on the Public Prosecution
Service, prepared by Jaros³aw Kaczyñski’s government, brought about some 
radical changes in the organisation of the prosecution service. The law
extended the scope of interference of superior prosecutors into the decisions
made by their subordinate entities, while at the same time expanding the
number of the superior prosecutors themselves. Such regulations, not
entirely clear, led to a situation where a public prosecutor in charge of the
proceedings was overly bound by the views of his superiors. The Act also
significantly increased the influence of the Public Prosecutor General, that
is the Minister of Justice, over the functioning of the prosecution service
by introducing a possibility to delegate prosecutors to work in a different
unit.
In order to ensure a non-political prosecution service, a draft law was
submitted by the parliamentary opposition, which aimed at making the
prosecution independent from the executive branch. The draft law provided
for the separation of the function of the Minister of Justice from the position
of the Prosecutor General, and for the latter to be appointed for a six-year
term. It also proposed introducing clear promotion requirements in the
prosecution service and making the disciplinary procedures more efficient.
Because of the decision of the ruling coalition, the draft was not even debated 
by the Sejm.
Apart from the legislative changes, there were also changes in the practical
operation of the prosecution service. A peculiar novelty of the years
2005–2007 was the frequent appearances of the Minister of Justice in the
media, which became almost a regular place where the Minister issued his
orders and announced his sometimes premature verdicts. The reputation of the
prosecution service in the legal world has deteriorated. There were many
protests against such practices, including the Association of the Prosecutors of
the Polish Republic, which expressed concern about the level of the
prosecution service’s political dependency.
Another negative occurrence was the involvement of the Minister of Justice in
the elections campaign in autumn 2007. Since the Minister of Justice also
holds the post of the Prosecutor General, such political involvement put the
whole law enforcement sector in an unfavourable light. The reports on the
alleged tapping of phones of the journalists critical of the government,
instituted on the Prosecutor General’s orders, should not be ignored. This issue 
should be explained as soon as possible because it creates an atmosphere of
anxiety which may, indirectly, paralyse journalist activity.
The activities of the Ministry of Justice in the years 2005–2007 aimed at
increasing the supervision of the executive branch of the government over the
operations of the prosecution service. That tendency caused a negative
reaction of the prosecutors themselves, which was not enough, however, to
prevent the political interference of the Minister with the matters handled by
the prosecution service.
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The judiciary
Changes in the Act on the Constitution of the Common Courts
of Law
In October 2006, the government presented a proposal for changes
determining the authority of court presidents and establishing the rules for
promoting judges. The proposal raised a lot of controversy. In spite of the
appeals of the legal community and an address of the First President of the
Supreme Court, on 29 June 2007 the Sejm passed the law introducing
a possibility to delegate a judge to another court by a decision of the Minister
of Justice as well as a possibility to suspend a judge in his or her official duties.
Under the law, such a suspension could take place after the judge’s immunity
had been lifted, which could be done with immediate effect. The provisions of
this act raised serious doubts. The main ones concerned the possibility of
transferring a judge, by force of a minister’s decision, which could become
a tool for interfering with the proceedings already in progress. Other concerns
were raised by the new provisions on judicial immunity, which apparently fail
to guarantee the accused judges their basic right to defence. 
Appointment of judges
The Constitution of Poland, in Article 179, vests in the President the power to
appoint judges on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary.
However, this article does not mention anything about a possibility to refuse
such an appointment. That is why it has been an adopted constitutional practice 
that has regulated that matter. That practice reflects the view that a refusal to
make such an appointment would distort the relations between the executive
authority and the judiciary. Meanwhile, for the first time since the adoption of
the new Constitution, the President refused to appoint as many as nine
candidates as judges. The President did not given any reasons for his decision.
The Status of the National Council of the Judiciary
The National Council of the Judiciary is an independent state body
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. For obvious reasons, in order
to perform this role it must be independent itself. Therefore, any proposed
changes to its status must be closely monitored. 
On the President’s initiative, a draft law was submitted amending the Act
on the National Council of the Judiciary. That law was passed by the Sejm on
16 March 2007. The most controversial provision of the new act prohibited the 
simultaneous holding of a post of the president or deputy president of a court
and sitting on the National Council of the Judiciary. This provision forced nine 
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out of twenty-three members of the Council to choose between sitting on the
Council and holding the position of the court president. This provision was
pronounced unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal, and the
conformity with the Constitution of some other provisions was still awaiting
the verdict of the Tribunal at the end of 2007.
Assistant judges – an unsolved problem
The position of assistant judges in the Polish justice system is rather
problematic. The fact that assistant judges report to consulting (advisor)
judges does not provide grounds to claim that they are independent nor does
the procedure according to which they are appointed by the Minister of Justice. 
Constitutional doubts with regards to the way in which the assistant judgeship
operates have been raised by the Constitutional Tribunal but so far as of the
end of 2007 no promising solutions to that problem have been offered.
Excessive length of court proceedings
One of the maladies of the Polish justice system during the period under study
was the lengthiness of court proceedings, both in criminal and in civil courts.
This issue was the subject of numerous complaints filed by Polish citizens with 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
The excessive length of court proceedings in Poland was noticed as a problem by
the Council of Europe Commissioner [for Human Rights] who pointed out two
issues in particular. The first was the insufficient number of auxiliary staff in the
justice system. The other concern was the ineffectiveness of an appellate measure,
namely the Act on the complaint against the violation of a party’s right to have
their case examined in court proceedings without undue delay. These two issues
were problems during the period under study and still require a proper solution. 
In Poland, the average length of civil proceedings, including economic
matters, from lodging a complaint to the enforcement of the judgement
amounts to 980 days, whereas in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
it is about 409 days. That is one of the reasons why Poland ranks only 75th on
the World Bank’s “Ease of doing Business” ranking. The excessive length of
court proceedings is also a serious problem in family cases, mainly those
concerning the enforcement of parental rights. Looking for a remedy against
the lengthiness of court proceedings should not be limited only to the process
of extreme formalisation of procedures, as this may lead to situations where
the real substance of the case is lost. Making procedures more efficient should
be reinforced with staff and the technical restructuring of Polish courts. 
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24-hour courts
The response of the PiS to that problem was an introduction of the so-called
24-hour courts. The courts were introduced by an Act dated 12 March 2007.
Under the Act, the procedure applied by these courts is the procedure of
expedited proceedings, which is expected to facilitate the fast trial of offenders 
who commit “acts of hooliganism”, who have been caught red-handed or
immediately after the commission of an offence. The idea itself seems to be
right since it has been operating successfully in some Western European states
such as France or Germany. However, certain provisions of the Act raise
doubts. For instance, the very notion of an “act of hooliganism” is introduced
into the Criminal Code in a somewhat imprecise way, and the procedure of
a fast trial, as proposed in the Act, may be interpreted as limiting one’s right to
defence. Another issue raising concern is the fact that the Act makes it possible 
in a 24-hour court to impose a penalty as high as 2 years of imprisonment. 
As far as remedies for the excessive length of court proceedings are
concerned, some positive measures were taken during the period under
study. Training provided to judges and prosecutors should also be praised as
well as increasing the budgets of courts and the funding for computerisation
of the courts. All that is, however, still not enough and other solutions, such
as for example the 24-hour courts or a proposal to impose additional
penalties on defence lawyers for intentionally delaying the proceedings,
seem to be only some media tricks which have not brought about any
substantial changes.
Reorganisation of the justice system
A lot was done between 2005 and 2007 with regard to the computerisation of
the justice system. Among others, electronic records of the trials were
introduced as well as an option of examining a witness by way of
a videoconference. Another solution which made this sphere much more
efficient was an obligation imposed on the courts to maintain their own
websites containing detailed information about their work. 
The Sejm of the 5th Term did not manage to pass a bill submitted by the
government regulating the status of a court expert. It is, however, easy to see
some evident flaws in the bill. According to the draft, there would be one
national list of court experts maintained by the Minister of Justice. Other
provisions refer to the requirements of court experts’ experience and
confirmation of their qualifications. Yet, the first provision itself, which in fact 
proposed to give the executive branch a possibility to indirectly interfere with
court proceedings, disqualified the bill.
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Under the Act of 29 March 2007, the scope of cases adjudicated by regional courts 
as the courts of first instance was extended. The aim of that idea was to make the
operation of the courts more efficient, but it actually paralysed them even more
and increased the already excessive duration of the work of Polish courts.
As it can be seen, the government policy towards the justice system left a lot to
be desired. There were some positive solutions, but there were also some
legislative errors. The political standards were additionally lowered by
statements of some executive branch representatives repeatedly attacking
judges and even the Constitutional Tribunal.
Prison system
The problem of overpopulated prisons
On 31 December 2006, the registered overpopulation of prisons in Poland
amounted to 119.4%. Such a level of overpopulation had a clear negative
influence on the implementation of education and rehabilitation programmes.
Another problem of Polish prisons was the low standard of healthcare or
conditions for disabled offenders. The minimum area per one prisoner
required in Poland is three square metres, and it is one of the lowest standards
in Europe. It should be kept in mind, however, that quite often the real area per
prisoner is even lower than that. For those reasons, in 2006 the Ministry of
Justice started to implement a plan aiming to improve the situation in Polish
prisons. The plan, however, concerned increasing the number of places with
the area of three square metres.
Serving a sentence of deprivation of liberty and restriction of
liberty – new solutions
One of the ways expected to reduce the overpopulation in penal institutions
was the introduction of new systems for serving a penalty: in a weekday prison
scheme (intermittent custody) and in the electronic tagging scheme.
Intermittent custody
The draft law adopted by the Council of Ministers assumed a possibility of
serving a sentence in the intermittent custody system, involving periods of
imprisonment alternating with periods at liberty. Offenders covered by the
programme would be those sentenced to not more than one year of
imprisonment and who have already served half of their term. The scheme still
requires some work, but once in its final shape, it may provide a real, at least
partial, solution to the problem of prison overpopulation. 
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Electronic tagging
Electronic tagging, as a substitute measure for serving a sentence in prison,
consisting in controlling the actions of an offender outside prison with the use
of electronic equipment, was adopted by the Sejm on 7 September 2007. This
form of serving the sentence has worked well in many countries and good
results should also be expected in Poland.
Fees for time spent in prison
A proposal of the Ministry of Justice, to charge the inmates for the cost of
bed and board during their time in prison, seemed to be contrary to the
Constitution as it would introduce a hidden, additional penalty in the form
of a fine.
Pre-trial detention – a still unsolved problem
Pre-trial detention is the main human rights issue we have to deal with in
Poland. Numerous appeals of the Council of Europe and attempts to intervene
on the part of the European Court for Human Rights do not change the fact,
that in the years 2005-2007 pre-trial detention was a notoriously abused
preventive measure in Poland. And a practice that is absolutely inadmissible, is 
the so-called “extractive arrest”, which is the use of pre-trial detention, by
prosecutors, for the purpose of obtaining a testimony. This whole issue,
compromising Poland in the international arena, calls for an immediate
solution.
System of legal assistance
Draft law on free legal assistance
The draft law on free legal assistance granted by the state to natural persons
provides, among other things, that non-governmental organisations whose
statutory duties consist in providing legal assistance should be selected by way
of competition. Unfortunately, the law was not passed by the 5th Term
Parliament.
Functioning of the court appointed legal assistance
The main stumbling block as far as the “court appointed” legal representation
is concerned is the lack of legal regulations applying to situations when
a lawyer resigns from representing his client.
The Justice System 55
Lawyers’ self-governing bodies
One of the objectives of the Ministry of Justice in the years 2005–2007 was to
create a transparent system of supervision over the operations of lawyers’
self-governing bodies and facilitate access to the legal profession. The aim of
the changes was to increase the accessibility of legal services by reducing their
prices. The main tool to achieve that was the gradual restriction of the powers
of professional self-governing bodies by extending the Minister of Justice’s
supervision over disciplinary courts. Therefore, a question arises whether the
proposed tool was not indeed the aim in itself.
Independence of the self-governing bodies of advocates
and legal advisers
Professional self-governing bodies are the implementation of the civil society
principles. They are particularly important in the case of public trust
professions, such as the legal profession. That is why the so-called “fight
against lawyers’ corporations” waged by the Ministry of Justice raised a lot of
concern.
Disciplinary court proceedings
In Poland, the discussion on the diligence of disciplinary court proceedings has 
continued for years. However, the attempt at solving the problem proposed by
the Ministry of Justice headed by Zbigniew Ziobro was unacceptable. The
Ministry’s proposals include, among others, handing over the disciplinary
court proceedings to common courts and introducing the post of a disciplinary
commissioner, reporting to the Minister, whose role would be to supervise
disciplinary proceedings. Those proposals were very negatively received by
the legal circles in Poland.
The changes could go in the right direction, as is shown by the Act passed on
29 March 2007, increasing the openness of disciplinary proceedings. These
changes will influence the reliability of the proceedings. 
Maximum fees for the services of advocates
and legal advisors 
The Ministry of Justice also proposed to introduce official maximum fees for
legal services, which, however, caused very firm opposition of the legal
circles. This is because an introduction of such a solution would in fact
constitute a violation of the free market rules. The proposal was, to a great
extent, perceived as an element of escalating the conflict between the Ministry
and the legal profession self-governing bodies.
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Opening the legal profession
The members of the legal community also agreed that there was a need to
reform the access to the profession. However, the proposal of the Ministry of
Justice suggesting breaking the monopoly of advocates and legal advisors for 
providing paid legal assistance by creating a three-tier system of lawyer
licences seemed inappropriate. Indeed, the proposal would lead to the
creation of a new legal profession, beyond anybody’s control, which would
not solve the problem but would simply cause even greater chaos.
Bailiffs
The reason for changes, in the case of the bailiffs’ self-governing body, was
also the limited access to the profession. As a result, the reorganisation of the
bailiffs’ allocated areas was introduced and bailiffs were allowed to operate all
over the country. These solutions can significantly restrict the right to defence
and the right to court.
Reform of the notarial service
The reform attempts of the Ministry of Justice also included the profession of
a notary. However, the reforms were not supported by the Sejm. The whole
proposal providing for the creation of the National Congress of Notaries and
increasing the Minister’s control over the notaries’ self-governing body was
rejected. 
Conclusions
The reforms to the justice system, announced by PiS in a rather high-flown
manner, boiled down mainly to disparaging the legal circles. The actions of
the government led to a disquieting situation in which the division of power
seemed to be threatened. Such conclusions emerge from politicising the
prosecution service and from introducing solutions giving the executive
authority real control over the appointments in common courts. The attempts
to abolish the independence of the professional self-governing bodies was
also a negative sign. Admittedly, certain actions, such as increasing the
budget of the judiciary or implementing the programme of computerisation
of the courts, deserve to be positively assessed; however, the overall balance
is very negative. The rest of the picture is filled with numerous practices
aimed at restricting the independence of judges and continuous verbal
attacks on the legal profession. All that led to a situation in which a radical
reform of the justice system is necessary. The reform, which the PO
(Citizens’ Platform)-PSL (Polish Peasants’ Party) government will have to
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stand up to, should, to a great extent, consist of solutions rectifying the errors
of the PiS government. Another important task seems to be the necessity to
restore the public trust in the prosecution service and the whole system of the
administration of justice. 
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Adam Bodnar and Dawid Szeœci³o
Combating Corruption: Institutions
and Their Activities
Introduction
Corruption is one of the most serious problems in Poland. In 2006, as many as
88% of Poles believed it to be the greatest problem for the functioning of the
state. In the Corruption Perception Index prepared by Transparency
International, in 2006 Poland ranked sixty-first, as the most corrupted EU
member state. Corruption is a real threat to the Polish economy. According to
a World Bank study, almost 40% of Polish businessmen recognised corruption 
as the main problem in running their businesses. Police statistics testify to the
size of the phenomenon of corruption. From 1999 to 2006 the number
of revealed corruption offences increased almost tenfold. The final example
of the omnipresence of corruption was a scandal, which was given a lot of
publicity by the largest Polish daily “Gazeta Wyborcza”, called the “Rywin
Scandal”. When PiS gained power they promised a ruthless fight with
corruption and seemed to enjoy the support of most of the society in this
respect. What was the result of this fight? Was it used for purely political
purposes? This chapter will attempt to answer these questions.
Central Anticorruption Bureau
Discussion over the creation of the CBA
The Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) caused a lot of discussions even
before it was established. Doubts were raised about the apolitical character of
the newly created service. Some also wondered whether it was necessary to
form another special service. Furthermore, it was demanded that it should be
the Sejm and not the Prime Minister who would appoint the head of the CBA.
That, however, would be contrary to the Constitution as according to its
provisions it is the Council of Ministers that manages the government
administration and the Act on the CBA states that it is a service belonging to
the government administration. Eventually, after some heated discussions, on
9 June 2006 the Parliament passed the Act on the Central Anticorruption
Bureau, and on 3 August 2006 the Prime Minister Jaros³aw Kaczyñski
appointed Mariusz Kamiñski as the Head of the CBA.
Duplication of responsibilities
The Central Anticorruption Bureau, the Internal Security Agency, the General
Inspector of Financial Information, and the General Inspector of Fiscal
Control are all state institutions whose remit includes combating corruption.
In this area, a key role is played by police supported by the activities of the
prosecution service. In the years preceding the period under discussion, the
powers of all these bodies within the scope of combating corruption were
strengthened. The creation of the CBA meant, in a way, denying the
effectiveness of the work of those agencies. The scope of the CBA’s activity,
not defined in the Act in a very precise way, heralded possible conflicts and
jurisdiction disputes with the existing agencies responsible for fighting against 
corruption. 
The powers of the CBA
The Act identifies fighting corruption as the main responsibility of the CBA.
But there are also a number of other activities, such as, for instance, checking
the truthfulness of property declarations, within the remit of the Bureau.
In order to carry out those tasks, the CBA officers have been equipped with
numerous powers, e.g. the right to issue orders to a third party requiring certain 
behaviour, the right to check the identity of people, the right to detain people,
the right to search people and premises, or the right to carry out body search.
Thus, in the case of the CBA, we are dealing with another service equipped
with powers to interfere deeply with the sphere of personal freedoms and
rights of the citizens. Moreover, the scope of CBA powers raises some
objections, as they go beyond the earlier announcements of the supporters of
the creation of that institution, beyond activities aiming at fighting corruption
(the CBA is also expected to combat activities which harm the economic
interests of the state).
Controversial activities of the Central Anticorruption Bureau
On 12 February 2007, the head of the cardio-surgery ward in the Hospital of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (one of the best hospitals in 
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Poland), Doctor Miros³aw G., was arrested. Sixteen out of twenty charges
submitted against him by the prosecutor’s office concerned accepting bribes.
Other charges were equally serious, including a charge of murdering a patient
in December 2006. CBA officers arrested the doctor in his office, before his
patients, and took him, handcuffed, to jail. It is therefore difficult not to have
an impression that it was just a media spectacle, as the arrest could have
happened in different circumstances. In connection with that case, there was
also a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence by the
Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro. During a press conference organised
after the spectacular arrest, the Minister said, “Nobody will ever again be
deprived of life by this man”. 
Even greater controversies surrounded the failed CBA investigation against
the former Deputy PM and Minister of Agriculture Andrzej Lepper, which
triggered the decomposition of the ruling coalition and resulted in early
elections. 
The CBA, as an agency fighting corruption, has at its disposal some well
developed methods of encroaching upon the sphere of the rights of an
individual. With such powers it must be subject to very precise regulations.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. That situation raises a suspicion that it
may become an agency for fighting political opponents of the ruling
government. Numerous actions undertaken by the CBA influenced its
already tainted reputation. As of 2007, the CBA seems to be a peculiar
“political police”.
Fighting corruption in the process of legislation
Act on lobbying – a dead law?
The Rywin scandal showed that it was necessary to regulate the issue of the
influence of lobbyists on the adopted norm setting acts. Therefore, on 7 July
2005, the Act was passed on lobbying activities in the legislative process. The
Act, however, is very imperfect, because according to its provisions, in
September 2007 only twelve people were involved in lobbying in the Sejm.
This is obviously false and it should be blamed on the insufficiently specified
notion of “lobbying activity” in the Act of 2005. Therefore, the law concerning 
that sphere should be changed.
The transparency of the legislative process
The transparency of the legislative process will not eliminate illegal pressures
but will make them much more difficult. Such transparency is to be ensured by
Combating Corruption: Institutions and Their Activities 61
the publication, once every six months, by the Council of Ministers of the
programme of legislative works, and by the institution of public hearing.
Unfortunately, in the 5th Term, there were public hearings concerning only six 
draft laws. That is definitely too little. Some thought should also be given to
increasing the transparency of the meetings of the parliamentary sub-committees,
for instance by publishing the minutes from such meetings. It is during such
sub-committee meetings that the risk of illegal pressure is particularly large.
Finally, the very speed with which the laws are passed in Poland also has
a negative offect on the openness of those processes. A great number of drafts
and laws make it impossible to devote an appropriate amount of time to control 
issues.
Anticorruption activities within the government
administration
Implementation of Anticorruption Strategy 2002–2009
The government of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski decided to implement the second
phase of the government strategy, referring to fighting corruption in the state
structures. This phase covers the years 2005–2009, and therefore it is difficult
to make a comprehensive assessment of something that is still in progress, but
the assumptions of the strategy could be discussed. The characteristic features
of the strategy include, first of all, an emphasis on legislative changes, while on 
the other hand, there is little space for organisational or educational tasks. Such 
issues as for example raising the level of ethical standards of administration
officials seem to be of key importance, because the law on combating
corruption in public administration is quite precise. What deserves a positive
assessment is the appointment in some public offices of the so-called ethics
advisors, whose role is to advise the staff on ethical matters and give an
opinion on draft legal acts, rules and standards concerning ethics and ethical
behaviour. However, this should only be the beginning of changes leading to
higher moral qualifications of public officials.
The draft law on the so-called ‘assets lustration’
The Sejm of the 5th Term worked on a draft law on restrictions connected with
performing a public function. The Act was supposed to cover the issue of
assets lustration of people performing public functions. The draft raised
certain objections as it included provisions on publicising assets declarations
of public figures, which should be supplemented with a similar declaration of
his or her spouse. That would be a violation of the right to privacy, if not of the
public figure, then certainly of his or her spouse. Another unacceptable
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element proposed in the draft was a penal sanction against persons who fail to
submit a declaration about their own or their spouse’s economic activity.
Deprivation of liberty for the period from one month to three years seems to be
a disproportionate punishment. 
The assets declarations submitted by the members of the European Parliament
may be used as an example for constructing such a law. These declarations
include data pertaining to extra-parliamentary income-generating activities
and financial support received by MEPs from a third party within the
framework of their political activity. The declarations are open and focus
solely on the time during which an MEP performed his or her function.
The influence of the restrictions in economic activity on corruption
threats
Polish economic law is full of laws which may lead to corrupt behaviour. This
could be blamed on the lack of transparent rules for the operation of inspection
services and a great number of permits whose receipt depends on the decision
of a public official. Lengthy administrative procedures, which are ubiquitous
in Poland, create a temptation to “expedite” them in an illegal way. That is why 
the legal regulations, particularly in this area, should be unified. It should also
be considered whether a not to abolish some of the concessions and permits or
at least make the process of obtaining them more transparent.
Anticorruption mechanisms in public procurement 
The public procurement procedures in Poland are complicated and provide an
opportunity for corruption. The problem is even more serious now, when the
organisation of the European Football Championship Euro 2012 has been
granted to Poland. In view of the challenge that this event poses, it is necessary
to efficiently carry out some public investment projects, but in a way that will
not raise any doubts as to them being free of corruption. Therefore, a number
of changes should be made leading to increasing the professionalism of people
working with public procurement and the procedures themselves should be
made more efficient.
Eliminating corruption in local government bodies
Anticorruption regulations applying to local
government officials
The main corruption threat at the level of the local government arises from
the distribution of European Union structural funds. In this respect, the local
government has problems similar to the national level. Here, too, there are no 
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clear procedures to counteract corruption, and the activities of the local
government (especially those related to competition procedures) are not very 
transparent. There is a lot to be desired with regard to the level of
involvement in making the local politicians and officials more ethically
sensitive.
The quality of anticorruption regulations 
A situation which is rather typical for Poland is the confusion with the
submission of assets declarations by local government officials after the 2005
elections. Just before those elections, a law was introduced that was supposed
to prevent the so far notorious failing to file such declarations. The legislators,
however, went a step too far and decided that a sanction for failing to submit
the property declaration and a declaration on the economic activity of the
spouse would be revoking the mandate. The law, which in addition did not
precisely specify the final date for filing the declarations, resulted in total
chaos and ended up in the Constitutional Tribunal, which overruled it. What
we saw was the best example of introducing provisions contrary to common
sense.
Prosecuting corruption in professional self-governing
bodies
The government formed by PiS, Self-Defence and LPR did not have very
good relations with professional self-governing bodies, in particular with
the lawyers’ self-government. As a result of that, the lawyers’
self-government was to be involved in the anticorruption campaign, which
was shown, for instance by the idea to introduce the requirement of
submitting assets declarations by advocates and legal advisors. However,
advocates and legal advisors are mainly entrepreneurs and not public
functionaries, and therefore an attempt to make them file property
declarations could not be reconciled with the principle of equality. The
possible disclosure of those declarations would constitute a radical
violation of the right to privacy. 
Apart from the lawyers, another group that seemed to be treated in a special
way by the authorities fighting corruption were doctors. The most spectacular
example of that is the above-mentioned case of Doctor Miros³aw G. It could be 
assumed that we were dealing here with crossing the border between
a praiseworthy fight against corruption and using it to weaken the position of
the group in conflict with the authorities.
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Conclusions
Fighting corruption is crucial, but it is also a very sensitive sphere. The means
used in that fight must not violate the standards that guarantee the freedoms
and the rights of an individual. Unfortunately, in our country, under the banner
of fighting corruption, actions going far beyond the scope of that fight were
undertaken between 2005 and 2007. The imperfect condition of Polish law is
partly to blame. However, the majority of the blame should be put on the
representatives of the government who used the fight with corruption as an
instrument for political purposes.
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Beata Roguska
Public Opinion on Democracy
Introduction
In 2005, Poles were disappointed with the rule of the left-wing Democratic
Left Alliance (SLD) and vested the government of the state in Law and Justice
(PiS), which promised to change the way of practicing politics, restore the
respect for the law and reduce corruption. However, soon after the elections,
some disturbing phenomena could be noticed, such as, for instance, restricting
the freedom of the media, subordinating the state to party interests, or exerting
pressure on the prosecution service. However, an important question is how
the public opinion responded to this. This chapter, on the basis of opinion
polls, attempts to show how the public assessed the condition of democracy in
Poland in the years 2005–2007, during the rule of the coalition formed by PiS,
Self-Defence and LPR (League of Polish Families).
Acceptance of the democratic order
Continuously, since 1992, Poles have recognised the superiority of democracy 
over other forms of government. In 2007 the acceptance of the democratic
system reached 59%. However, in spite of the continuous support for
democratic system, in the second half of 2005, an increase of authoritarian
tendencies could be seen in the society. For the first time, more than half (52%) 
of respondents believed that non-democratic rule might sometimes be more
desirable than democratic rule. At that time, as much as 40% of those polled
were ready to agree that a strong individual holding power might turn out to be
better than a democratic government. That tendency, however, grew weaker,
and already in May 2007 the percentage of people ready to agree that in certain
conditions non-democratic rule might be more desirable than democratic rule
fell from 52% to 36%.
Susceptibility to authoritarian slogans is related to one’s education, place of
residence and level of affluence. In 2007 only 17% of people with a university
education supported the strong-arm rule, and 73% rejected it firmly.
Moreover, people who live in large cities, with over 500,000 inhabitants, only
in 17% supported authoritarian rule, and in 72% rejected it firmly. Those who
have lower level of education and live in smaller towns are often much more
eager to support strong leadership. Most often, such a non-democratic solution 
is chosen by those who are badly off. The features which are conducive to the
development of authoritarian tendencies also underlie the sense of political
alienation. The level of this alienation was also the highest in the period of
fifteen years, exactly at the time of elections of 2005. At that time, as much as
50% of Poles agreed with a statement that for people like them it did not really
matter whether the government was democratic or not. In 2007, such an
opinion was expressed by 43% of respondents. 
These polls show that PiS won the elections in 2005 on the wave of weakened
identification with the democratic system and a growth of authoritarian
tendencies. However, two years of this party’s rule did not brought about an
increase of anti-democratic tendencies in the society. On the contrary, the
importance of democracy became more appreciated.
Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Poland
Poles appreciate democracy as a certain model, but their assessment of the way 
democracy functions in the country is rather critical. It depends on the current
political events. After the period of negative assessment in the years
2002–2004, when only about 22% of respondents were satisfied with the way
democracy functioned in Poland, in February 2006, positive assessments
increased to 40%. That growth may be linked with the strong support for the
first PiS Prime Minister – Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. Another fall in the level
of satisfaction (30%) coincided with the formation of the coalition government 
of PiS and LPR (League of Polish Families) and Self-Defence. Over half of
Poles (54%) were dissatisfied with the way democracy functioned in Poland. 
As it can be seen, the support for a democratic system remained strong during
the period under study in spite of the dissatisfaction with the way democracy
functions. According to experts, a reason for that was the regularity of
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elections and at least partial exchange of elites, which accompanies them. It is
the assessment of the politicians that, to a great extent, influenced the
assessment of the functioning of democracy in Poland.
Assessment of the activity of public institutions
in Poland
Assessment of the activity of the main bodies of state authority
The government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (2005–2006) enjoyed strong
public support, caused, among others, by the personal popularity of the Prime
Minister himself. The cabinet of Jaros³aw Kaczyñski (2007) had much worse
ratings, (approximately one-fourth of the public). It did have, on the other
hand, a group of strong and regular supporters. The left-wing governments of
Leszek Miller or Marek Belka could not count on such support. The support
for PiS was declared mainly by older people, welfare beneficiaries, and retired
people. The rule of that government was critically assessed primarily by
people who were better educated and better off. The percentage of the
opponents of the Jaros³aw Kaczyñski government before the early elections in
2007 was 46% of respondents. 
The PiS government was positively assessed by the public, mainly for its fight
against crime and combating corruption, and it received very negative
assessments for its foreign policy.  
The presidency of Lech Kaczyñski has received much less positive assessment 
than the presidency of Aleksander Kwaœniewski. Poles liked the style with
which President Kwaœniewski exercised his power and praised him for his
foreign policy. The reason for their dissatisfaction with President Kaczyñski is
his excessive political involvement on the part of his brother’s party and
creation of numerous conflicts. Only during the first three months, the positive
assessment of the presidency of Lech Kaczyñski prevailed, and since then the
majority of assessments have been negative. 
Even worse than the opinion on the work of the government and the President
were the opinions on the works of the Sejm and the Senate. A certain tendency
has been established in the assessment of the Polish parliament. Since
mid-1999, the Sejm and the Senate have been negatively assessed by the
majority of the public. The objections raised by the respondents against the 5th 
Term of the Sejm (2005–2007) include primarily, acting only for the benefit of 
parties and politicians and taking wrong decisions. As a result, the 5th Term
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was perceived as not being very representative. Every third respondent stated
that there were no deputies in that Sejm who would share their opinions about
the state matters. Such a low sense of representation of citizens had not been
noted in Poland since 1989. 
While the assessment of the parliament has been negative for many years, the
assessment of local authorities has been very positive. In 2007, local
authorities were positively assessed by over two-thirds of those polled. In local 
government elections people were less guided by party affiliations. They more
rarely voted for someone as a representative of a given party and they more
often voted for that person as the administrator of a given commune or town,
regardless of his or her political origin. They also tended to re-elect the people
who have proved to be good so far, who have performed their roles well.
Assessment of the activity of the justice system
For years, Poles had had very little confidence in the justice system. During the 
PiS rule, the assessment of the justice system bodies improved. In 2007, for the 
first time, more people assessed the work of the courts and the prosecution
service positively than negatively. That corresponds with a clear growth of the
sense of security of citizens. In 2001 four-fifths were of the opinion that life in
Poland was not safe. In 2007 more than half of Poles believed that Poland was
a safe country. Thus, the government activity in this respect enjoyed public
support, and it was additionally reinforced with a real fall of crime rate. It is
also symptomatic that Zbigniew Ziobro, who was often criticised for
demagogy and “manual control” of the prosecution service, was in the earlier
part of 2007 the most popular politician in the country. The public also
positively assessed the activities of the authorities which aimed at fighting
corruption. The politics itself stopped being perceived as the most corrupted
sphere of life. In 2007, 35% of respondents held that view, where as in
previous years it was 61%. Politics was replaced in this dishonourable position 
by the healthcare service. During the PiS rule, as much as 53% of respondents
found it to be the most corrupt sphere of life. 
Regarding the Constitutional Tribunal, it is a very important institution,
safeguarding the conformity of statutory law with the Constitution. However, its 
activity is not widely known to the public. Until 2007, more than half of Poles
were not able to assess the activity of the Tribunal. In the period under study, the
number of people who recognised this institution increased. That coincided with 
the growth of confidence in the Tribunal. However, the opinions on the activity
of this body have a political tinge because of the conflict between the Law and
Justice government and the Constitutional Tribunal.
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The economic situation and democracy
During the period 2005–2007 most of the society was convinced that market
economy was more advanced than the building of the democratic system in
Poland. Most Poles accepted the rules of the market economy, although they
declared that they were aware of the negative phenomena that accompany it,
such as unemployment or social inequality. Economic prosperity that the
country witnessed in previous years probably had an impact on the better
assessment of the economic situation by the public. In May 2007, for the first
time since 1989, more people (31%) assessed the economic situation in Poland 
as good than as bad (24% of respondents). The better opinion on the economy
coincided with the growing satisfaction with living conditions, although still
most Poles described their material situation as average. The positive
assessment of the economic situation and satisfaction with the living
conditions were conducive to the acceptance of democratic order and were
significant for assessing the functioning of democracy in Poland. 
Conclusions
The crisis of confidence in political elites, which we had seen for many years,
resulted in a drop in the level of identification with the existing political
system. The longing for a strong-arm rule was growing. Those tendencies
brought in effect the victory of PiS in the 2005 elections. The new government
initially enjoyed a lot of public trust but a number of its actions (e.g. removing
the popular Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz from power, the
coalition with populist and nationalist partners LPR and Self-Defence) led to a
rapid decrease in the public support for the government. Thus, PiS did not
manage to overcome the crisis of confidence in political institutions. Poles
negatively assessed the activities of the Sejm and the Senate. What did change
was the assessment of the justice system institutions. Poles noticed the
reduction of corruption in politics and an improvement in the level of safety.
At the same time, probably mainly thanks to the satisfaction with the condition
of Polish economy, the level of identification with the democratic system
increased.  As of 2007 the assessment of the way in which democracy
functions in Poland is still negative, but it is improving. As a result, the
authoritarian tendencies have significantly weakened, which is conducive to
the reinforcement of the public legitimisation of the democratic system in
Poland. 
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Lena Kolarska-Bobiñska
Citizens’ Activity and Social Protests
Introduction
The level of trust of Poles in one another and in public institutions is one the
lowest in Europe. That has an impact on the low participation in civil
organisations. Furthermore, the level of participation in elections is also low:
40.5% of eligible voters participated in the elections of 2005, while in 2007 –
54%. In Poland, a tendency present in many other countries (i.e. that together
with the growth of the level of education in a given society the interest in
political matters also grows) does not exist. 
In this context, an interesting phenomenon was the revival and intensification
of a certain type of activity in the years 2005–2007, namely actions and
protests of the middle class. Protests related to group economic interests have
been permanently present in Poland over more than a decade. A special
characteristic of 2005–2007 were protests related to values. Ideology and
slogans used by the ruling coalition and the confrontational style of practicing
politics met with strong opposition of many groups. They have also
contributed to crystallising the group and professional interests of the
intelligentsia and the emerging middle class. People who had been going their
individual ways and had been busy with improving their own material
situation started to think in terms of a group and defend the values that were
important for them. However, the emerging awareness of their own role and
position was, to a great extent, a reaction to political attacks and therefore had a 
defensive nature. 
The ruling Law and Justice party announced in their programme the necessity
to change the system that had existed since 1989. In view of that party, groups
of those who were better educated and more affluent, often with links to
business and special services, had held a privileged place in that system. Those 
“cheat-elites”, as PiS politicians dubbed them, benefited from the political
system transformation, disregarding the needs of the rest of the society. For the 
first time in Poland such a strong rhetoric was used and directed against the
elites. That rhetoric, as a result, strengthened the self-awareness of the attacked 
social group – the intelligentsia – and provoked some defensive actions of its
members. The intelligentsia did not like the authoritarianism of the governing
party and was convinced that it was necessary to defend the freedom of speech
and the freedom to express their own views. For the first time since 1989, the
intelligentsia and the middle class felt that their values and their group interests 
were threatened.
The areas of conflict and dispute
During the period under study, the intelligentsia was a group that attached a lot
of importance to the sphere of values. This group highly rated democratic and
free market values, supported closer links with Europe and shared the idea of
self-government, strong local government and self-organisation of citizens.
Whereas PiS and its coalition partners declared attachment to some opposite
values: moral traditionalism, scepticism towards Europe, distrust towards
society and a centralised vision of the state. Therefore, already at the moment
of defining the objectives and the vision for changes, the conflict was
inevitable. 
Numerous actions in the form of pickets, demonstrations, open letters and
appeals concerned the defence of certain values. Their aim was to fight for
human rights and tolerance. In the actions concerning the so-called “common
good”, the problems related to environmental protection, European funding,
education or culture. Protests were staged against the construction of a road
crossing in the Rospuda Valley, against the attempts to centralise the state and
decisions concerning European funds. The intelligentsia protested against
politicising public administration and against specific solutions introduced by
the authorities within the public sector. 
Many disputes concerned particular people. The protest against the Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Roman Giertych, received the most
publicity. About 138,000 people signed an appeal to have him ousted from the
ministerial post. The counter-action, which was an expression of support for
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the minister, gathered 3,700 signatures. More than 20,000 people defended the 
slandered author of Polish economic reform, Leszek Balcerowicz. 
About twenty actions concerned a dispute regarding historical memory. The
main bone of contention was the vetting process. Certain situations caused
a strong public response. That was the case with some press accusations of
collaboration with the communist security services directed against
a distinguished opposition activist Jacek Kuroñ and a writer Zbigniew Herbert. 
There were many protest letters, supported by a great number of citizens. 
Numerous groups organised actions to defend their economic interests, in
particular to receive salary rises (e.g. healthcare workers, teachers, postal
workers). There were also protests demanding the acceleration of the
privatisation process of the protesters’ own enterprises (e.g. trade union
members of the Gdañsk Shipyard or Polish Airlines) and protests against
politicising state-owned companies.
Forms of activity and protest
During the rule of Law and Justice, there was a whole range of forms of
protests. The most frequent one was the form of a written protest.
Written protests, appeals, petitions
Written protests include primarily open letters, counter-letters, declarations,
appeals, petitions and statements. The number of such protests grew
significantly, and the Internet played an important role in this. In the analysed
time, there were six large actions of collecting signatures via the Internet. 
The scale of the phenomenon may be best described by the number of almost
138,000 signatures collected via the Internet, under an appeal to dismiss the
Minister of Education, Roman Giertych. The greatest number of signatures,
however, was collected in the traditional way. In May 2006, over 700,000
people put their signatures on the citizens’ draft law on pensions and disability
benefits from the Social Security Fund.
The following groups fought for their group interests in the form of written
protests: employees, trade unions and professional groups (20 protests),
scientists and academics (10 protests), teachers, students and pupils
(9 protests), journalists (7 protests) and lawyers (7 protests). The protests
staged by the lawyers challenged verbal attacks by the representatives of the
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authorities against the verdicts issued by judges, including the judges sitting
on the Constitutional Tribunal. Journalists mostly protested against the act that 
made them submit vetting declarations. Scientists and academics could not
agree to the statements made by the ruling party members undermining their
authority and questioning their moral qualifications. By written protests,
teachers tried to influence the dismissal of the Minister of Education, Roman
Giertych. Similarly, doctors protested against the Interior Minister Ludwik
Dorn, who had threatened the striking doctors with drafting them into the
army. A written protest appeared also in the field of foreign policy. Former
foreign ministers wrote a letter in which they expressed their disagreement
with the new course in foreign policy.
Actions, marches, picket lines
From the end of October 2005 to the beginning of May 2007, there were about
thirty large strikes, pickets, marches and demonstrations in Poland. Twelve of
the largest strikes mainly involved the healthcare workers, teachers, miners,
postmen, railway workers and automotive industry workers. Social activity
also revealed itself in the form of “sit ins” in certain places, as it was the case
with the “white town” in front of the Council of Ministers’ Office or the camp
of environmentalists in the Rospuda Valley. The trade union were not very
active in the protests.
The marches mainly concerned ideological matters. They were related to the
slogans of defending tradition or promoting tolerance. There was a widely
publicised case of the ban imposed on the Equality March in Poznañ in 2005.
The Tolerance March in Kraków in 2006 ended in riots provoked by the
opponents of the march. One of the largest demonstrations was the Equality
Parade (Warsaw Pride) in June 2006, in defence of the rights of gays and
lesbians, which was the largest legal demonstration of sexual minorities in
Poland. Over 3,000 people gathered there. The March in Defence of Life was a
reaction to the previously mentioned march and attracted approximately 5,000
listeners of Radio Maryja and LPR supporters. 
In the years 2005–2007, rallies supporting political parties also took place. The 
“Blue March” of the Citizens Platform (PO) attracted, according to police
reports, about 11,000 people on 7 October 2006. Rallies supporting PiS
gathered, according to the police, about 4,000 people in the case of the rally on
2 August 2006 in the Gdañsk Shipyard and 8,000 people on the rally in
Warsaw. The rally in support of LPR attracted about 2,000 people. Those
events were not spontaneous; however, they proceeded according to
a previously prepared scenario. 
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Strikes
In the period under consideration, the strike in the healthcare service deserves
special attention. It was of a permanent nature and it concerned not only higher
wages but also certain changes in the healthcare system. Since the end of 2005, 
doctors and other personnel of the healthcare service resorted to different
forms of protest, from taking leave on demand, through refusal to fill out death
certificates to announcements of quitting their job. The nurses’ strike, whose
“headquarters” was the “white town”, was not an expression of solidarity with
doctors. Nurses, after they had received certain financial promises, ended their
protest. 
Teachers also went on strike, disagreeing with the freezing of wages in the
so-called budget sphere. Among their demands was the expectation that the
option of earlier retirement would be prolonged until the year 2011 and the
demand for the dismissal of Minister Roman Giertych. At the end of May
2007, teachers in approximately 20,000 schools went on a warning strike. 
In January 2007, a 24-hour strike was held in mines in Silesia. The miners
protested against the blockage of employment in mines and the reduction of
real wages. They also demanded a right to earlier retirement. 
The expectation of a pay rise was also the reason for strike of postmen. At a
certain point, half of the 25,000 postmen went on strike. The strike ended at the 
end of 2006 and resulted in promises of a rise in wages from the new year on.
Conclusions
Protests of various social groups have taken place in Poland for many years.
However, they have mainly concerned economic interests of various groups.
That is why the numerous protests related to values and matters connected with 
governing the state and the common good, should be treated as specific for
2005–2007. It was a response to the radical slogans used by the ruling camp
and to the confrontational way of practicing politics selected by them. As a
result, the individuals who had so far been atomised started to think of
themselves in terms of a group.
Various questions appear whether the growing awareness of their own values
and interests and the self-defensive reactions will lead to a better
self-organisation of various groups and whether the growing sense of
influence, created by the participation in protests, will translate into greater
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civil and political activity. It is difficult to answer these questions, although,
definitely, all that did result in the greater participation in the elections in 2007. 
Will it, however, lead to a better self-organisation of different circles and to
a greater interest in public affairs? Only time will show. It is also difficult to
say if the growing awareness will also lead to better self-restraint in those
groups in which certain actions contrary to professional ethics took place. It
was often the case that such behaviour was not sufficiently condemned by the
members of their own group. The key issue is whether the debate that has been
in progress since 2005, on the functioning of democracy and its institutions,
has made the emerging middle class aware how big their role in shaping the
face of Polish democracy really is.
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Grzegorz Makowski
Government Policy Towards
Non-Governmental Organisations
In a democratic system, citizens must have the right to organise themselves and
to identify and solve the problems of their own community. This is the essence
of the civil society. That is why an analysis of the government policy towards
non-governmental organisations implemented in the years 2005–2007 is so
important.
The situation of non-governmental
organisations
There are approximately 65,000 non-governmental organisations in Poland,
including about 40,000 associations, 6,000 foundations and 17,000 other
organisations (such as for instance, religious organisations, churches,
employers’ organisations, trade unions, physical culture and sports
associations). All those entities form the so-called Third Sector. Even though
the very number of the organisations seems large, in reality not much more
than half of them are active and the vast majority is in a very poor financial
situation. What is worse, in recent years, the indicator of the growth of the
number of associations and foundations has stopped and every year fewer
organisations are formed. Furthermore, the existing organisations do not
attract the attention of the public. Over a year, only every fourth Pole devotes
his or her time for work for the benefit of a non-governmental organisation.
Few people are interested in donating 1% of their income tax for the benefit of
a selected organisation of public benefit. Even though such an option has been
available since 2004, only a few percent of taxpayers use it.
The picture of the non-governmental sector is therefore not very optimistic,
although the law that regulates it seems to be appropriate. The Law on
associations, the Act on foundations and the Act on organisations of public
benefit and on the voluntary sector clearly define the situation of
non-governmental organisations, emphasise their status of independent
entities, raise their prestige and specify the basic conditions for their
cooperation with public administration. There are regulations encouraging
taxpayers to make donations for non-governmental organisations. 
This short analysis gives us the current picture of the condition of
non-governmental organisations. In order to fully understand the ideas which
governed the actions of the cabinets formed by PiS and the coalition parties
(Self-Defence and LPR), it is worth taking a closer look at the situation of the
non-governmental sector before the year 2005.
Non-governmental organisations and the state policy
before the year 2005
Former cabinets (similarly to the last PiS cabinet) lacked the systemic
thinking about the civil society sector. The only bright exception was the
period when the sector of non-governmental organisation became the object
of interest of Jerzy Hausner – Minister of Economy, Labour and Social
Policy and Deputy Prime Minister in the governments of Leszek Miller and
Marek Belka (2001-2005). It was mainly thanks to him that in 2003 the Act
on the activity of public benefit and the voluntary sector was passed, which
identified the basic mechanisms of cooperation between public
administration and civil organisations. The Act also introduced other forms
of using public funds allocated for the activities of civil organisations.
The Council of the Public Benefit Activities was also established, which in
fact, in a number of situations, represented the interests of the whole third
sector. 
In the context of the development of the civil society and the system of
assistance to non-governmental organisations, great expectations were
connected with Polish accession to the EU. After the accession, the
organisations hoped that a special “Civil Society” programme would be
launched. The cabinet of Marek Belka started working on the programme in
2005. The works, however, were abandoned when Law and Justice and its
coalition partners took power.
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The civil sector in the programme declarations
of Law and Justice
The rule of PiS, Self-Defence and LPR was characterised not only by the lack
of vision for the development of the civil sector, but also by worsening the
relations between the authorities and non-governmental organisations. That,
however, was not a surprise. The pre-election declarations of the parties which
eventually came into power after the 2005 elections, and particularly Law and
Justice, had already indicated that this would be the case.
Pre-election declarations – the Law and Justice programme
The PiS electoral programme “4th Republic. Justice for all” for 2005 said very
little about non-governmental organisations. If they were mentioned at all, it
was in the context of some specifically defined objectives and tasks set by the
authorities, for instance: activities supporting the improvement of Polish
relations with Ukraine and Belarus or the promotion of appropriate parent
attitudes. Paradoxically, such little interest in the role of civil organisations is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that as late as in 2005, PiS described their
vision of the state as “civil”. PiS politicians must have noticed that
inconsistency and abandoned that term for the sake of the term
“solidarity-based state”.
Non-governmental organisations
in the “solidarity-based state”
After the elections, the programme of PiS assumed the form of the document
“Solidarity-based state of caring citizens”. That document said even less about
non-governmental organisations than the pre-election programme. However,
just a glance at the vision of the solidarity-based state revealed a lot. It was
supposed to be, according to the promises of PiS politicians, a state with a
strong administrative apparatus, promoting national traditions, ensuring, first
of all, security and therefore developing controlling institutions, law
enforcement agencies, and special services. The solidarity-based state was not
intended to be a state that trusted its citizens and allowed them to identify their
own objectives, problems and modes of action; thus it did not promote civil
attitudes and self-organisation.
Civil society in the policy speeches of PiS Prime Ministers
In the policy speeches of the two Prime Ministers which came from PiS, Prime
Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Prime Minister Jaros³aw Kaczyñski,
very little was said about non-governmental organisations. However, both of
those speeches and other statements of PiS representatives pointed to a vision
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of civil society whose proper functioning seemed to depend only on the strong
authority of the state. Such a vision was difficult to reconcile with the modern
understanding of civil society. Prime Minister Jaros³aw Kaczyñski belittled
the real achievements of Poles in the area of building civil society. One could
often come across statements that civil society in Poland, in the shape in which
it was built, served only the political interests of dissident groups originating
directly from the communist period.
Activities of the PiS governments towards the civil sector
– direction of change, opportunities and threats
Under the coalition agreement, the Ministry of Social Policy became a fiefdom 
of the politicians of the populist Self-Defence. This ministry holds the most
responsibility for the activities related to the non-governmental sector. Giving
this ministry away was a clear signal that the PiS-led cabinet did not treat the
development of civil society as a priority. Legislative initiatives prepared by
the ruling coalition very rarely took into account the opinion of the
non-governmental community, even if they directly affected the situation of
those organisations. Also the activity of the institutions of social dialogue was
significantly weaker during the rule of Law and Justice.
Council for the Public Benefit Activities
The deputy minister from the Ministry of Social Policy responsible for the
cooperation with the council for the Activity of Public Benefit (and through
the Council the cooperation with the whole non-governmental sector), was
severely incompetent in this matter. Inept activities of the Ministry, as for
instance the belated consultations of the draft amendments to the Act on
foundations and incessant problems with access to information, did not allow 
the members of the Council to perform their duties properly. That eventually
led to extreme dissatisfaction within the Council, which then filed a
complaint with the Minister of Labour. The complaint did not bring any
effect. 
The Parliamentary Group for non-governmental organisations
The Parliamentary Group for non-governmental organisations was formed
during the PiS rule and consisted of representatives of PiS, PO and SLD. It was 
one of the few initiatives supported by the politicians of Law and Justice which 
served the purpose of developing civil dialogue and was addressed at
non-governmental organisations. However, the government did not seem to
notice the existence of this group and very rarely took notice of the views of
the deputies, senators and non-governmental organisations gathered in this
forum for change.
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Public hearings
The Act on lobbying in the legislative process, passed in the previous term of
Parliament, came into force in March 2006, when PiS was already in power. It
introduced a very important institution to the legal system contributing to the
building of civil dialogue, namely the public hearing. However, neither the
government nor the deputies of the parliamentary majority seemed to be
interested in making proper use of it. Over the two years of PiS rule, the public
hearing was used only six times, usually in the case of acts of minor
significance. In the summer of 2006, at the last moment, the public hearing of a 
very important draft law changing the election law for local government
elections was cancelled. A positive exception was a very substantive and
efficiently carried out Sejm hearing on the amendment of the Act on public
benefit activity. That, however, happened just before the elections, in
September 2007.
Legislative initiatives of the Law and Justice governments
There were certain positive aspects of the PiS government activity for the
development of the civil sector. One of them was continuing, in a very open
way, of the work on the amendment of the Acts on the public benefit activity
and on the voluntary sector. They contained a number of good proposals
aiming at, among others, the simplification of the procedures of transferring
funds to organisations. On the other hand, the draft amendment also contained
some rather unfortunate solutions, for example restricting the possibility of
conducting economic activity by public benefit organisations. An equivocal
assessment of this amendment is, however, impossible since it was never
passed.
The history of a draft proposal for changes in the Act on foundations prepared
by the Chancellery of Prime Minister Kaczyñski was completely different.
That draft had not been sufficiently consulted with the non-governmental
sector and completely ignored the real problems that foundations come across
in their operations. It focused only on increasing control over foundations. It
could have caused some far-reaching restrictions in the powers of the founder
and the foundation management board and could have made it difficult for
them to conduct economic activity. 
The government was not very eager to propose legal changes that could solve
the acute problems of the organisations. An example of that may be the
amendment of the Act on the tax on goods and services, awaited by the
organisations, which was expected to abolish or minimise the tax imposed on
goods and services provided by companies for charitable purposes. In spite of
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the announcements and promises, such an amendment had never been
prepared. A draft for changes in the Act was only submitted by senators from
the opposition. 
In spite of the promises of the government, the funds transferred to the Civil
Initiatives Fund were not increased. The Fund provides funding for valuable
projects implemented by non-governmental organisations. In the draft budget
for the year 2008, prepared at the end of the rule of the Jaros³aw Kaczyñski’s
cabinet, funds for that purpose had not been allocated at all.
Conclusions
Already in the pre-election announcements of the parties that ruled in the years 
2005–2007 the need to develop the civil sector was not noted. That period,
however, was not only a continuation of a policy of the lack of policy towards
the civil sector. Even when the government or the coalition parties initiated
some actions in this area, they were subordinated to the extremely statist vision 
of public life advocated by PiS politicians. 
That situation was not favourable for the development of civil society and
non-governmental organisations. It certainly did not solve the problem of
apathy and reluctance of citizens to participate in public life. The
announcements of the PiS cabinet concerning changes in the area of civil
activity, included in the government project “Strategy of supporting the
development of civil society for the years 2007-2013” prepared at the end of its 
rule, was belated and had no chance to become anything more than empty
promises.
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In sti tu te of Pu b lic Af fa irs
List of pu b li ca tions – ye ars 2000–2008
Lan gu a ge ve r sions: PL – Po lish,  EN – En glish, RU – Rus sian, UKR – Ukra i nian,
D – Ge r man
For t h co ming:
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se, Eu ro pe at the cros s ro ads
2008
Bo oks
q To masz Ka Ÿ mie r czak, Ka mi la He r nik (ed.), Lo cal com mu ni ty in ac tion. So cial ca pi tal. 
So cial po ten tial. Lo cal go ve r nan ce 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska, Ma te usz Fa³ko wski (ed.), Poland -Germa ny- Fran ce. Mu tu -
al Per ce p tion af ter the EU en la r ge ment. PL 
q Col le c ti ve work: Ac ti va te the ele c to ra te. PL 
2008
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Jo an na Fo mi na, Ju sty na Fre lak, NEXT STOPSKI LONDON Pu b lic Per ce p tions of La -
bo ur Mi gra tion wi t hin the EU. The Case of Po lish La bo ur Mi grants in the Bri tish
Press. EN
2007
Bo oks
q Ma rek Ry m sza, Grze gorz Ma ko wski, Ma g da le na Du d kie wicz (ed.), Sta te and Third
Se c tor. Law and in sti tu tions in ac tion. PL
q Ja cek Ko cha no wicz, S³awo mir Man des, Mi ros³aw Ma ro dy (ed.), Cu l tu ral aspects of
the eco no mic trans fo r ma tion. PL
q Ja ros³aw Æwie k-Ka r po wicz, Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz, Ma g da le na Pu cyk. Fo re word:
Krzy sztof Bo bi ñ ski, The Po lish Me m bers of the Eu ro pe an Pa r lia ment. The ir Ac ti vi ties 
and Im pact on the Po lish Po li ti cal Sce ne. EN, PL
q To masz Ka Ÿ mie r czak (ed.), Chan ge in lo cal so cie ty. PL
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska (ed.), Yo ung di sa b led. Pro fes sio nal eli ci ta tion and un ty pi cal
forms of em p lo y ment. PL
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska (ed.), Yo ung di sa b led abo ut one self.  Fa mi ly, edu ca tion, work
q Ma rek Ry m sza, To masz Ka Ÿ mie r czak, So cial ca pi tal, so cial eco no my
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska, Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, Ja ros³aw Zbie ra nek, De mo c ra cy in Po -
land 2005–2007, PL
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, Piotr KaŸmier kie wicz, Le a r ning from ex pe rien ce of West Eu ro pe -
an think thanks: a stu dy In think tank ma na ge ment. EN
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se (ed.), Pre ven tion aga inst cor ru p tion in use of Eu ro pe an fo -
uns. PL.
q Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz, The Po lish Ex pe rien ce In Con trol ling Il le gal Mi gra tion. Les -
sons for EU Can di da tes and Nei g h bo urs. EN
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), To emi gra te and to re turn. La bo ur mi gra tion of Po les
and na tio nal po li cy. PL
2006
Bo oks
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska (ed.), Yo ung di sa b led. Pro fes sio nal eli ci ta tion and un ty pi cal
forms of em p lo y ment. PL
q Ma rek Ry m sza, To masz Ka Ÿ mie r czak, So cial ca pi tal, so cial eco no my. PL
q Jó ze fi na Hryn kie wicz, Re fu sed. Ana ly sis of the pro cess of al lo ca te chi l dren in the care
in sti tu tion. PL
q Anna Kwak (ed.), From vi ca rio us pro te c tion to adult life. PL
q Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz (ed.), EU Ac ce ssion Pro spects for Tur key and Ukra i ne. De ba tes 
in New Me m ber Sta tes. EN
q Ma te usz  B³asz czyk, Ja cek Sro ka (ed.), Ne tworks or stru c tu res? So cial dia lo gue at  the 
re gio nal le vel. PL
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se (ed.), Pre ven tion aga inst cor ru p tion in use of Eu ro pe an fo -
uns. PL
q Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz, The Po lish Ex pe rien ce In Con trol ling Il le gal Mi gra tion. Les -
sons for EU Can di da tes and Nei g h bo urs. EN
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), To emi gra te and to re turn. La bo ur mi gra tion of Po les
and na tio nal po li cy. PL
q Jen ni fer El rick, Ju sty na Fre lak, Pawe³ Hut, Po land and Ge r ma ny to wards the ir na tio -
nals in East. Po len und De ut s chland gegenüber ihren Dia spo ras im Osten. PL, D
q Ma te usz Fa³ko wski, Ag nie sz ka Po pko, Po land and Ge r ma ny. Mu tu al per ce p tion af ter 
the en la r ge ment of the Eu ro pe an Union. PL
q Ja ros³aw Æwie k-Ka r po wicz, Piotr Ma ciej Ka czy ñ ski, As si sting Ne go tia ted Trans ition
to De mo c ra cy. Les s sons from Po land 1980–1999. EN
q Ma te usz Fa³ko wski, Ag nie sz ka Po pko, Po len und De ut s che. Ge gen sei ti ge Wahr n h -
mun gen nach der Oste rwe i te rung der Euro pa i s chen Union. D
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska, Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, Ja ros³aw Zbie ra nek (ed.), Ac ti ve ci ti zen,
mo dern ele c to ral sy stem
2005
Bo oks
q Ma g da le na Ar cze wska,  Not only one act. Law abo ut the non - go ven ment or ga ni za -
tions. PL
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q El ¿ bie ta Pu t kie wicz, Pri va te tu to ring – grey zone of edu ca tion. PL
q Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz (ed.), The Vi se grad Sta tes Be twe en Schen gen and Neig -
bou r ho od. EN 
q Ma r cin Wa le cki, Mo ney and Po li tics in Po land. EN
q Do mi nik An to no wicz, The uni ve r si ty of to mor row: chal len ges and po li cy mo dels.
PL
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska, Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, Piotr Ma ciej Ka czyñ ski (ed.), Bri d -
ges ac ross At lan tic? At ti tu des of Po les, Czechs and Slo vaks to wards the Uni ted
Sta tes. PL, EN
q Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, Ma te usz Fa³ko wski (ed.), Ci ti zens of Eu ro pe. Eu ro pe an in te gra -
tion in Po lish pu b lic life. PL
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Bar ba ra Fedy szak- Radzie jo wska (ed.), The pro cess of de-ma rgina li sa tion of Po lish
co un try si de: aid pro gram mes, le a ders, eli tes and NGOs. PL 
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se (ed.), Ana ly sis of the po ssi bi li ty of in tro du cing a re gio nal sy -
stem of imp le men ta tion of EU stru c tu ral funds be twe en 2007 and 2013. PL
q Jo an na Ko r czy ñ ska, Ma ciej Du sz czyk, The de mand for fo re ign la bo ur fo r ce in Po -
land. PL
q Ro man Do la ta, Bar ba ra Mu ra wska, El ¿ bie ta Pu t kie wicz, The sup port of ca re er de ve -
lo p ment and ne eds of te a chers in the field. PL
q An drzej Ole cho wski, The Po lish agen da in Eu ro pe. PL
q The Po lish Eu ro pe an po li cy: ob je c ti ves and po ssi bi li ties. PL
q Anna Wi³ko wska, As ses s ment of te a chers` edu ca tions in Po land. PL
2004
Bo oks
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), Eco no mic cons cio u s ness of so cie ty and ima ge of bu si -
ness, PL
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se, The EU re gio nal po li cy. Exa m p les of Gre e ce, Ita ly, Ire land
and Po land, PL
q Krzy sztof Ko na rze wski, Edu ca tio nal sy stem un der re form. Pro gram ba sis and cir -
cu m stan ces of edu ca tion. PL
q Ma rek Ry m sza (ed.), So cial re forms. Ba lan ce of de ca de. PL
q Ele o no ra Zie li ñ ska (ed.), In ter na tio nal Cri mi nal Co urt. PL
q An dras Sajo, Fre e dom of  ex pres sion. RU, EN
q Piotr Ka Ÿmier kie wicz (ed.), Neig hbou r ho od Ac ross a Di vi de. EN
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se (ed.), Po land and the new EU co he sion po li cy. PL
q El ¿ bie ta Pu t kie wicz, Anna Wi³ko mi r ska, Pu b lic and pri va te scho ols: com pa ra ti ve stu -
dy of dif fe rent en vi ron ments. PL
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Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Ma te usz Fa³ko wski, Ka i -O laf Lang, Com mon task. Po land, Ge r ma ny and Ukra i ne in
the chan ging Eu ro pe. Ge me in sa me Au f ga be. De uchland, Po len und die Ukra i ne im
sich wan de len Eu ro pa. PL, D
q Po lish po li ti cal sce ne in 2004. Con ti nu a tion or chan ge?
q Ma te usz Fa³ko wski (ed.), First Steps in the EU. Po lish po li cy in the Eu ro pe an press. PL
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska, Ma rio la Rac³aw - Mar ko wska (ed.), Mor bid ab sen ce in Po land.
PL
q Piotr KaŸ mier kie wicz (ed.), Se cu ring Eu ro pe and Ame ri ca. EN
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se (ed.), Po land and the new EU co he sion po li cy. EN
q Ma³go rza ta ¯ytko (ed.), Small child in edu ca tio nal and so cial se cu ri ty sy stem. PL 
q Ro man Do la ta, El ¿ bie ta Pu t kie wicz, Anna Wi³ko mi r ska, Re form of the se con da ry
scho ol cer ti fi ca te. Opi nions and re com men da tions. PL
q Ma rek Ry m sza (ed.), Co o pe ra tion of the ci vil se c tor with the pu b lic ad mi ni stra tion. PL
q Krzy sztof Ko na rze wski, Edu ca tion in pri ma ry scho ol and gy mna sium in 2002/2003.
PL
q Ry szard Her but, Ja cek Sro ka, Piotr Sula,  So cial dia log on re gio nal  le vel. PL
q Ma rio la Rac³aw - Mar ko wska, S³awo mir Le gat, Vi ca rio us pro te c tion of child. PL
q Bar ba ra Mu ra wska, Se gre ga tion at the do or step of pri ma ry scho ol. PL
q Kry sty na Ka mi ñ ska, Lo cal go ve r n ments role in the edu ca tion duty of the si x -y e ar old. PL
q Ar tur No wa k - Far, Ar ka diusz Mi cho ñ ski, Na tio nal ad mi ni stra tion in the EU pro cess of 
min ding. PL
q Jan Barcz (ed.), Con sti tu tio nal aspects of Po lish mem be r s hip in the EU. PL 
2003
Bo oks
q Te o dor Bu len da, Ry szard Mu sid³owski (ed.), Pe ni ten tia ry and post -peni ten tia ry sy -
stem in Po land. PL 
q Piotr Ma zur kie wicz (ed.), The Ca t ho lic Church on the eve of Po land's ac ces sion to  the 
Eu ro pe an Union. PL
q Bo gus³awa Bu dro wska, Anna Ti t kow, Da nu ta Duch, The Glass Ce i ling- Bar riers and
Li mi ta tions in the Ca re ers of Po lish Wo men. PL
q To masz Ka zi mie r czak, Ma rek Ry m sza (ed.), To wards ac ti ve so cial po li cy. PL
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska, Ma rio la Rac³aw - Mar ko wska, Lo cal com mu ni ties aga inst yo uth
unem p lo y ment. PL
q Kry sty na Igli cka (ed.), In te gra tion or disc ri mi na tion? Po lish chal len ges and di lem -
mas at the do or step of multi cul tu ra lism. PL
q Kry sty na Igli cka (ed.), Mi gra tion and its im pact on la bo ur mar kets in Po land and
Ukra i ne. EN and UKR
q Ma rek Zu bik (ed.), Pre ven ting con flict of in te rest in con tem po ra ry Po land. PL
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q Ma riu sz - Jan Rad³o, Chal len ge of com peti ti ve ness. Li s bon Stra te gy in Eu ro pe an Union 
af ter en la r ge ment. PL 
q Be a ta £aciak (ed.), The child in con te m po rar me dia cu l tu re. PL
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), The ima ge of Po land and the Po les in Eu ro pe. PL 
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se, The EU re gio nal po li cy at the voi vo de s hip le vel. PL
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Jan Barcz (ed.), The con se qu en ces of EU mem be r s hip for the Po lish le gal and admi ni -
stra ti ve sy stem. PL
q Ar tur No wa k - Far, Ar ka diusz Mi cho ñ ski, The na tio nal ad mi ni stra tion in the EU de ci -
sion ma king pro cess. PL
q Te o dor Bu len da, Ry szard Mu sid³owski (ed.), Pri son po li cy in 1989–2002. PL
q Jan Barcz, Ce za ry Mik, Ar tur No wak, Far Re view of the EU Con sti tu tio nal Tre a ty:
chal len ges for Po land. PL
q Krzy sztof Pan ko wski, Eu ro pe an Pa r lia ment. PL and EN
q Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz (ed.), Tu r ning thre ats into oppo r tu ni ties. EN
q To masz Szlen dak, Ne gle c ted pla y gro und. Sty les of chil d be a ring and pro blems of edu -
ca tio nal ine qu a li ties. PL
q Kry sty na Igli cka, Piotr Ka Ÿ mier kie wicz, Mo ni ka Ma zur - Ra fa³, Ma na ging Im mi gra -
tion – the case and ex pe rien ce of Po land in the con texts of re le vant di re c ti ves of the
Eu ro pe an Com mis sion, (in co -o pe ra tion with CSM). PL 
q Mi ros³aw Gre wi ñ ski, The Role of Eu ro pe an So cial Fund in Po li cy to Co m bat Unem p -
lo y ment. Con c lu sions for Po land. PL
q Ewa Gie r ma no wska, Ma rio la Rac³aw - Mar ko wska, Lo cal Com mu ni ties Aga inst Yo uth
Unem p lo y ment. PL
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), Be fo re the Eu ro pe an Re fe ren dum, ab sen ce, re si stan ce, 
sup port. PL
q To masz Schi ma nek, An Ove r view of Fo re ign Aid for Po land. PL
q Ja kub Bie r nat, Ka ta rzy na Gmaj, Ma³go rza ta Wo kacz, Not Only Vi sas. Ka li nin grad
Re gion and EU En la r ge ment. PL
q Ma r ta Za ho r ska (ed.), The Pre - S cho ol Educa tion - Bar riers and Oppo r tu ni ties. PL
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), Pa rish Cle r gy on In te gra tion with the Eu ro pe an
Union. PL
2002
Bo oks
q Ur szu la Ku r cze wska, Ma³go rza ta Molê da - Z dziech, Lob by ing in the Eu ro pe an Union. PL
q Chan ges in the edu ca tio nal sy stem. Re sults of the em pi ri cal re se arch. PL
q Kry sty na Igli cka (ed.), Re - mi gra tion of the Po les – sad or suc ces s ful re turns?. PL 
q Bar ba ra Fa ty ga, Jo lan ta Ro ga la -Ob³êko wska, Li fe sty les of the yo uth and the drugs.
The re sults of the em pi ri cal re se arch. PL 
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q Ma³go rza ta Fu sza ra (ed.), Wo men in Po land at the turn of the cen tu ry. New gen der
con tract?. PL
q Ja cek Ku cha r czyk (ed.), Eu ro pe – Ame ri ca. Trans at lan tic di men sion of re forms in the
Eu ro pe an Union. PL
q Ma r cin Wa le cki (ed.), Fi nan cing po li tics – be hind the sce nes. PL
q Pro te c tion of the re fu ge es in Po land (in co -o pe ra tion with MSZ and UNHCR). PL
q Jan Barcz (ed.), Does the Con sti tu tion need to be re a li g ned? Sy ste mic and con sti tu tio -
nal aspects of Po land's ac ces sion to the Eu ro pe an Union. PL
q Adam Zie li ñ ski, Ma rek Zu bik (ed.), The fu tu re of Po lish sy stem of ju sti ce. PL
q Hen ryk Do ma ñ ski, The po ve r ty in the post -com mu nist so cie ties. PL 
q Ja nusz Ha lik (ed.), The el de r ly in Po land. So cial and he alth con se qu en ces of the age -
ing of the so cie ty. PL 
q Jó ze fi na Hry nie wicz (ed.), Aga inst Po ve r ty and Unem p lo y ment: Lo cal Gras s ro ots Ini -
tia ti ves. PL
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), Be fo re the Eu ro pe an re fe ren dum – ab sen ce, re si stan -
ce, sup port. PL
q Han na Bo jar, Jo an na Ku r cze wska, Con se qu en ces of the Schen gen Tre a ty – the re sults
of the re se arch con du c ted in the com mu ni ties from the Ea stern bor de r land. PL 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), In ha bi tants of ru ral are as and Eu ro pe an in te gra tion:
opi nions, kno w le d ge, le vel of be ing in fo r med. PL and EN 
q Ma riu sz - Jan Rad³o, Li s bon stra te gy of the Eu ro pe an Union. Con c lu sions for Po land.
PL
q Be a ta Ro gu ska, Mi cha³ Strze sze wski, So cial in te rest, kno w le d ge and in fo r ming abo ut
Po land's in te gra tion with Eu ro pe an Union. PL 
q El ¿ bie ta Tar ko wska, Ka ta rzy na Ko rze nie wska, The yo uth from the fo r mer col le c ti ve
farms 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), The fu tu re of Po lish po li ti cal sce ne fol lo wing the par -
lia men ta ry ele c tions of 2001. PL 
q Mi cha³ Wa r cha la (ed.), Po land's press ima ge in the EU me m ber sta tes. PL 
q Ire na Bo ru ta, The stra te gies of fi g h ting unem p lo y ment in in ter na tio nal or ga ni sa tions:
UE, MOP, OECD. PL
2001
Bo oks
q Ja nusz Bor ko wski, The ci ti zen vi s -a - vis pu b lic ad mi ni stra tion af ter the sy ste mic re -
forms
q W³adys³aw Cza p li ñ ski, Anna Wy ro zu m ska, Ju d ge and the in ter na tio nal law 
q Ry szard Chru œciak, Wi ktor Osia ty ñ ski, Con stitu tion- ma king pro cess in 1989–1997
q Ju liusz Gar da wski, Tra de unions at a cros s ro ads 
q Bar ba ra G¹ciarz, W³od zi mierz Pa ñ ków, So cial dia lo gue in Po land – fi c tion or chan ce?
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q Jó ze fi na Hryn kie wicz (ed.), The me a su res and in di ca tors in the he alth care sy stem 
q Jó ze fi na Hryn kie wicz (ed.), The decen tra li za tion of the so cial se r vi ces of the Sta te 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska, An drzej Ro s ner, Je rzy Wi l kin (ed.), The fu tu re of ru ral are -
as in Po land – vi sions, stra te gies, con cepts 
q Krzy sztof Ko na rze wski (ed.), Scho o ling du ring the first year of the edu ca tio nal sy stem 
re form 
q An to ni na Ostro wska, The di sa b led in Po land in the 1990s 
q Ewa Pop³awska (ed.), The Con sti tu tion for the en la r ged Eu ro pe  
q Ma rek Ry m sza (ed.), Lone mot he r ho od and the so cial po li cy 
q Jan Wi da cki, Ma rek M¹czy ñ ski, Ja ni na Cza p ska, Lo cal com mu ni ty, pu b lic se cu ri ty.
Cen tral and Ea stern Co un tries un der trans fo r ma tion
q Mi ros³aw Wy rzy ko wski (ed.), Con sti tu tio nal ba sis for the sy stem of law 
q An drzej Zoll (ed.), Ra tio nal re form of the pe nal law 
q Po lish road to Schen gen. Ex perts' opi nions
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Xy me na Do li ñ ska, Ma te usz Fa³ko wski, Po land – Ge r ma ny. Mu tu al per ce p tions du -
ring the en la r ge ment of the Eu ro pe an Union (also in Ge r man)
q Ma rzen na Gu z - Vet ter, Pha re 2000 for Ea stern Po land and Si le sia. As ses s ment of the
admi ni stra ti ve pre pa red ness 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), The Po les and the gre at chan ge. The Eu ro pe an in te -
gra tion (also in En glish)
q Jo an na Ko nie cz na, Po land – Ukra i ne. Mu tu al per ce p tions (also in Ukra i nian)
q El ¿ bie ta Pu t kie wicz, Ma r ta Za ho r ska, So cial ine qu a li ties in edu ca tion. A stu dy of six
gmi nas 
q Be a ta Ro gu ska, Ja cek Ku cha r czyk, The par lia men ta ry ele c tions of 2001 and Po land's
in te gra tion into the Eu ro pe an Union 
q Mi ros³aw Stec (ed.), Pu b lic Ad mi ni stra tion Re form of 1999 – di lem mas and achie ve -
ments 
q Mi cha³ Wa r cha la, Po land – Fran ce. Mu tu al per ce p tions du ring the Eu ro pe an en la r -
ge ment (also in French)
q Marek Zu bik (ed.), De fi cien cies of the sy stem of ju sti ce 
q Com mon Eu ro pe. Opi nion of Po lish non- gover n men tal ana ly tic cen tres (also in En glish)
2000
Bo oks 
q Kate Han sen Bundt  No r way says 'no' 
q A pe a sant, an agri cu l tu ral wor ker or a fa r mer? Po land's ac ces sion to the Eu ro pe an
Union – ho pes and fe ars of Po lish ru ral are as 
q Ja ni na Cza p ska, Lo cal se cu ri ty. So cial aspect of cri mi nal pre ven tion 
q Hen ryk Do ma ñ ski, So cial hie ra r chies and bar riers in the 1990s 
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q Mi ros³aw Gra nat (ed.), Non- gover n men tal or ga ni sa tions in Po land. Le gal and fi nan -
cial ba sis 
q Mi ros³aw Wy rzy ko wski (ed.), Con sti tu tio nal cu l tu res 
q To masz Grze gorz Gros se, The EU re gio nal po li cy and its in flu en ce on the eco no mic
de ve lo p ment. The stu dy of Gre e ce, Ita ly, and Ire land – con c lu sions for Po land 
q Ja cek Klich (ed.), The hope for the la bo ur mar ket. Small and me dium en te r pri ses in
eco no my 
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), Four re forms – from the con cept to the re a li sa tion
(also in Rus sian)
q Lena Kolar ska- Bobi ñ ska (ed.), The se cond wave of Po lish re forms (also in Rus sian)
q Mark Le o nard, The so lu tion for Eu ro pe. Be twe en fe de ra lism and the Eu ro pe of na tions
q Be a ta £aciak i Ja cek Ku r cze wski (ed.), Cor ru p tion in so cial life 
q Ma r cin Wa le cki (ed.), Fi nan cing po li tics. Ele c tions, mo ney, po li ti cal pa r ties
Ex perts' opi nions, re se arch re ports, re com men da tions
q Xy me na Do li ñ ska, Mi cha³ Wa r cha la (ed.), The press ima ge of Po land in the EU me m -
ber sta tes (qua r te r ly re ports)
q Ma ciej Du sz czyk, Do ro ta Po przê cki, The opi nion of the tra de unions and the em p lo y -
ers' or ga ni sa tions on the EU en la r ge ment 
q Ja nusz Grze lak, Do mi ni ka Ma i son, Gra ¿y na W¹so wi cz- Ki ry³o, The Po lish way of ne -
go tia ting in the con text of Po land's in te gra tion into the Eu ro pe an Union 
q Da riusz Ry szard Ki jo wski (ed.), Two de gre es of admi ni stra ti ve juri s di c tion 
q Adam Mie l cza rek, Ma³go rza ta Si ko r ska, Po land – Spa in, Po land – Swe den. Mu tu al
per ce p tion du ring the EU en la r ge ment 
q Prze mys³aw Mie l cza rek, The en tre pre ne urs' opi nions on the chan ces and thre ats for
the se c tor of small and me dium en te r pri ses 
q Ma³go rza ta Si ko r ska, Po land – Au stria. Mu tu al per ce p tion du ring the EU en la r ge ment
q Ja d wi ga Sta ni sz kis, Post -com mu nist sta te: in se arch for iden ti ty
q Miros³aw Wy rzy ko wski (ed.), The acco unta bi li ty of pu b lic au t ho ri ties for the da ma ge
in the light of Art. 77 pa ra graph 1 of the Con sti tu tion of the Re pu b lic of Po land
q Mi ros³aw Wy rzy ko wski (ed.), The sy ste mic mo del of the pu b lic pro se cu tor's of fi ce.
Di s cus sion on the pro ject of the Mi ni stry of Ju sti ce of 15th March 1999 
q Ja nusz Za le ski (ed.), Ef fe c ti ve me t hods of ma na ge ment in pu b lic ad mi ni stra tion
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